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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates the use of the game theory and the real options theory in real estate 
development at the strategic level, trying empirically to explain different economic observations 
among different metropolitan cities and different property types. 
 
The real options theory provides a rich theoretical framework to analyze investment values in 
real estate development. It takes the market uncertainty into consideration, while the widely used 
neoclassical NPV valuation method takes a deterministic approach. A simplified real options 
valuation model is set up in this thesis to calculate the option premium value of waiting for 
developers. However, since it is done in a monopolistic setting, the strategic interaction aspect of 
real estate development will be analyzed using the game theory model. The interaction of the 
game theory model and the real options model will provide a comprehensive and powerful 
framework to study the timing strategy of developers.  
 
Using data spanning quarterly from 1995 to 2013 among 5 property types (single-family house, 
apartment, industrial, office, and retail) and 44 MSAs, this thesis analyzes the relationships 
empirically between the volatility of underlying assets, the land cost ratio, the option premium 
value, and the timing of development. The aims of the study are twofold. First, the study 
compares different market characteristics among different MSAs and different property types 
from the option game theoretic perspective. Second, it analyzes the effect and the use of the 
game theory and the real options theory in the context of real estate development. 
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1.0  Chapter 1: Introduction 
   
1.1  Purpose of the thesis  
 
This thesis investigates the use of game theory and real options in real estate development 
at a strategic level, backed up by empirical data to try to explain different economic 
observations among different regions and metropolitan cities. 
 
The real options approach to analyzing investment under uncertainty has become part of 
the mainstream literature of financial economics. Essentially, the real options approach to 
analyze the opportunity to invest in a project is analogous to an American call option on 
the investment opportunity. Once that analogy is made, the vast and rigorous machinery 
of financial options theory can be applied to analyze such investment option. The real 
options approach is well summarized in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996). 
The most well-known result of the real options literature is the invalidation of the 
standard net present value (NPV) rule of investing in any project with a non-negative net 
present value. The optimal investment rule, as described in the real options literature, is 
to invest when the asset value exceeds the investment cost by a potentially large option 
premium. While the widely used neoclassical NPV valuation method takes a 
deterministic approach, the real options valuation method takes into account the option 
value created by uncertain future outcome.  
 
Since the 1980s, there have been lots of interest in academic research in real options 
valuation methods. A vast array of models and frameworks have been studied and 
proposed. Titman (1985), Williams (1991), and Trigeorgis (1996) provide some of the 
most influential conceptual frameworks in the field, especially as applied to real estate 
development. While the real options valuation gives a more comprehensive picture of 
investment value as compared to the neoclassical NPV valuation method, it is done in a 
monopolistic setting. That is partially the reason why the real options valuation is not 
applied in real-world situations as often as it should be because economic markets are 
rarely purely monopolistic. The action of firm A will be affected by the action of firm B. 
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The option value as described in real options pricing methods is not an accurate 
representation of project value as valuated by firms. Grenadier (1996), and Schwartz and 
Torous (2007) demonstrate that competitions among real estate developers erodes the 
option value, and illustrate that the real options valuation method alone is not 
comprehensive enough to reflect real-world situations. Strategic interactions are essential 
components to be considered in the valuation process. Therefore, the application of the 
game theory in the real options analysis will provide important insights at a strategic 
level. And this thesis empirically compares the implication of the game theory and the 
real options in real estate development among 4 regions (East, Midwest, South, and 
West), 44 metropolitan cities, and 4 property types (Apartment, Industrial, Office, and 
Retail) for commercial markets, and single-family houses for residential markets.    
 
1.2  Research motivation & hypothesis  
  
Real estate development is one of the classic applications of the real options. As in 
Titman (1985) and Williams (1991), the development of real estate is analogous to an 
American call option on a building, where the exercise price is equal to the construction 
cost. An option is a contract or situation that gives its holder the right but not the 
obligation to buy (if a call) or sell (if a put) a specified asset (e.g. common stock or 
project) by paying a specified cost (the exercise or strike price) on or before a specified 
date (the expiration or maturity date). If the option can be exercised before the maturity, 
it is an American option; if only at the maturity, a European option. In real estate 
development, if the value of a building is higher than the cost of construction, the residual 
value is what developers can pay for the land to make it a zero NPV project. In other 
words, the land value is analogous to the option value. By holding on to the piece of land 
and deferring development, the intrinsic value of the land would be higher than the 
residual value as demonstrated in Quigg (1993). Some numerical examples will be 
illustrated in following chapters. Taken literally, the standard, myopic real options 
approach implies that developers should ignore the construction behavior of their 
competitors. However, in real estate markets, developers are likely to face considerable 
competitions from competitors, and the development activities of competitors will have a 
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fundamental impact on one’s development options. By extending the options framework 
to account for strategic interaction, a much richer set of investment implications is 
obtained. While the standard real options models dictate that a developer should wait 
until the development option is considerably in-the-money, which means that the value of 
a building is much larger than the cost of construction, competitions and the fear of pre-
emption will likely force developers to build much earlier. In addition, while standard 
real options models imply that developments will be simultaneous, game-theoretic 
models allow for the possibility of sequential developments. Competitive models of real 
estate development can also help explain boom-and-bust behavior in commercial 
constructions, as well as why rational developers may construct new buildings in the face 
of declining demand and market values as illustrated in Grenadier (1996).  
 
Regarding the interaction of the real options and the game theory, the timing strategy of 
real estate developers has long been a complex issue to study, affected by many external 
economics forces. This thesis focuses on the relationships of the land value, the land cost 
ratio, and the volatility of underlying assets in different regions and metropolitan cities, 
trying to explain developers’ timing strategy in different markets depending on those 
variables from an option game theoretic perspective. Intuitively, when the volatility of 
underlying assets is high and the land cost ratio is high, the timing option value will be 
high too, which implies that developers should wait to observe the market trend better 
before exercising the option to develop or redevelop the piece of land. A large set of data 
spanning from as early as 1995 to 2013 across 4 regions, 44 metropolitan cities, and 4 
property types will be used to analyze the relationship and discrepancy between the 
observed data and results predicted by the option game theoretic approach.  
 
1.3  Research methodology  
 
Asset values of 4 property types (Apartment, Industrial, Office, and Retail) in 30 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) spanning from 2001 to 2013 are collected from 
Real Capital Analytics, Inc (RCA) for the commercial portion of the study. Construction 
or replacement cost data spanning from 1993 to 2013 is collected from RS Means. Asset 
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values of single-family houses in 44 MSAs spanning from 1995 to 2013 are collected 
from Lincoln Institute of Land Policy for the residential portion of the study. For the 
commercial portion, the construction activity is measured by number of square feet 
completed (industrial, office, and retail) and number of units completed (apartment), with 
data collected from CBRE. For the residential portion, the construction activity is 
measured by number of permits issued for single-family houses, with data collected from 
U.S. Census Bureau.  
 
Using the real options pricing model described in detail in section 2.1.1, the option 
premium, defined as the difference between the option value of waiting and the residual 
land value, is calculated for each property use in each MSA within a certain given time 
period. The option premium is a value indicating theoretically the magnitude of benefits 
for a developer to wait, rather than to develop now. This is a better indicator than the 
absolute option value of waiting because the option premium eliminates the distorted 
effect of different asset value ranges for different uses in different MSAs. For example, 
given everything the same, higher asset values by definition will always give higher 
option values because the subject in question is of higher values, which will falsely imply 
that office developers will always have a higher benefit of waiting compared to industrial 
developers because of their inherently higher absolute option values of waiting. When 
compared across different uses and MSAs, the option premium should be used to 
measure the magnitude of incentive for developers to wait.   
 
To study the relationship between the option premium, the land cost ratio, and the timing 
strategy of developers, the following regression is applied to measure the degree of 
correlation: 
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CA = α + β (Cp) + γ (LCR) + ɛ 
 
Where   CA = Construction Activity 
  Cp = Option Premium value 
= Ct - (St - Kt ) 
  LCR  = Land Cost Ratio 
   = !!!!  
   S = property asset value  
   K = construction / replacement cost  
   
In this thesis, two levels of relationships are studied: (1) across time within a MSA, and 
(2) across MSAs within a time period for both the commercial and residential markets. 
Sections 4.0 and 5.0 will further elaborate all the details.  
 
1.4  Results & interpretation 
 
As presented in detail in sections 4.0 and 5.0, for commercial markets, the higher the 
asset value volatility is, the higher the option premium value will be, and the lower the 
level of construction activities will result. Meanwhile, the higher the land cost ratio is, the 
lower the level of construction activities will result. At an aggregate level across multiple 
MSAs, apartment developments are the most sensitive to the option premium value, 
followed by industrial and office developments. Retail developments are the least 
sensitive to the option premium value. Compared between the time-series (across time 
within a MSA) study and the cross-sectional (across multiple MSAs within a time period) 
study, the time-series study seems to show higher sensitivity to the option premium value 
than the cross-sectional study does. The time-series study also shows more significant 
regression results than the cross-sectional study does (sections 4.1 and 5.1.1).  
 
For residential markets, results between the time-series study and the cross-sectional 
study are not as consistent as those of the commercial markets study. In the time-series 
study, the higher the asset value volatility is, the higher the option premium value will be, 
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and the lower the level of construction activities will result. Meanwhile, the lower the 
land cost ratio is, the lower the level of construction activities will result. However, the 
cross-sectional study shows the opposite. Compared between the time-series study and 
the cross-sectional study, the time-series study again seems to show higher sensitivity to 
the option premium value than the cross-sectional study does. Between commercial 
markets and residential markets, the regression results show that residential markets are 
more sensitive to the option premium value than commercial markets do. Residential 
markets also show more significant regression results than commercial markets do 
(sections 4.2 and 5.1.2). Overall, the correlation is a lot stronger between the option 
premium value and the level of construction activity than that between the land cost ratio 
and the level of construction activity. In the Variance Inflation Factor tests for the issue 
of multi-collinearity, both results of commercial markets and residential markets show 
that the correlation between the option premium value and the land cost ratio is not strong 
or problematic enough to distort their effect on the level of construction activity (section 
5.3).  
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2.0  Chapter 2: Overview of Fundamentals 
   
2.1  Real Options  
  
The real options valuation, also often termed the real options analysis (ROV or ROA), 
applies option valuation techniques to capital budgeting decisions. A real option itself is 
the right, but not the obligation, to undertake certain business initiatives, such as 
deferring, abandoning, expanding, staging, or contracting a capital investment project. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have explained investment decisions in detail in their book. 
They site that most investment decisions share three important characteristics. First, the 
investment is partially or completely irreversible. Second, there is uncertainty over the 
future rewards from the investment. Third, some flexibility about the timing of the 
investment usually exists. These three characteristics interact to determine the optimal 
decisions for any investor.  
 
Within the neoclassical theory of investment, the net present value (NPV) theory, has not 
recognized the interaction between irreversibility, uncertainty, and the choice of timing. 
Real world investments seem less sensitive to changes in the interest rate and the tax 
policy, and much more sensitive to the volatility and the uncertainty over the economic 
environment. A growing body of literature has shown that the ability to delay an 
irreversible investment can profoundly affect the decision to invest. The traditional 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method dictates that companies should not execute any 
negative NPV project. The new view of investment opportunities as options has shown 
that the traditional NPV rule can give very wrong answers unless all relevant option 
values are included in the NPV. Note that if choices are investing now or never, the 
standard NPV rule applies because there is no option to wait years.   
  
 
 
 
  
	   15	  
2.1.1 Real Options Pricing Model setup  
    
When applied in real estate development, the real options can be considered an American 
call option on the asset value of a building with the exercise price being the construction 
or replacement cost. When the construction or replacement cost is subtracted from the 
asset value of the building, the residual value is the maximum price that a developer 
should pay for the piece of land to make it a zero NPV project. As stated above, this 
classic NPV approach neglects the option value of waiting for future development. If the 
real options pricing model is applied in the decision-making process, the option value 
should be considered as well. In each period, developers should compare the residual 
value with the option value to better understand their optimal action. The option premium 
value (Cp) is defined as the difference between the residual value and the option value. If 
the option premium value is positive, it means that the option value is higher than the 
residual value, and the option to wait is more valuable than the decision to develop the 
piece of land in this period, vice versa. A fundamental and pure form of the real options 
pricing model will be used in this thesis to examine empirically the relationship between 
the land value and the timing strategy of developers. Time t=0 is defined as the initial 
period when the decision is about to be made. The property asset value (St) will either go 
up by a multiple (u) to (St+0.25 = uSt) with the probability (p) or go down by a multiple (d) 
to (St+0.25 = dSt) with the probability (1-p). The construction or replacement cost will 
increase at an average growth rate throughout the periods. Since it is an American call 
option, the option value (Ct) is defined as the maximum value between the residual value 
and the option of waiting till next period. Key equations are as follows: 
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 St = e-rt [ p x uSt + (1-p) x dSt ]   
  Kt = e-gt Kt+0.25   
Ct = max { St - Kt , e-rt [ p x Cu t+0.25 + (1-p) x Cd t+0.25] } 
Cp = Ct - (St - Kt ) 
p = !!"!!!!!   
u = 𝑒! ! 
d = 𝑒!! ! 
 
 Where: S = property asset value per sq.ft.  
   K = construction / replacement cost per sq.ft.  
   C = option value of waiting 
   Cp = option premium value  
   p = probability of value moving upward 
   u = multiple of value moving upward 
   d = multiple of value moving downward 
   σ = volatility of value 
   r = risk-free rate 
   g = construction cost growth rate 
 
Volatility of value or cost is calculated using historical data with the following equations:  
 
 ΔS = ln( !!!!!!.!") 
 
 SD = (!!!)!!!!  
 
 σ = SD x 4  (annualized volatility for quarterly data) 
 
 
See Figure 2.0 for the binomial tree setup. 
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t = 0  t = 0.25 t = 0.5  t = 0.75 t = 1 
 
 
         uuuuS  
 
       uuuS 
 
     uuS    uuudS 
  
           p uS    uudS 
  
 S    udS    uuddS 
                   
          1-p dS    uddS 
 
     ddS    udddS 
 
       dddS 
 
         ddddS 
 
 
 
 K  K0.25  K0.5  K0.75  K1  
 
 
 
         Cuuuu  
 
       Cuuu 
 
     Cuu    Cuuud 
  
           p Cu    Cuud 
  
 C    Cud    Cuudd 
                   
          1-p Cd    Cudd 
 
     Cdd    Cuddd 
 
       Cddd 
 
         Cdddd 
 
Figure 2.0: Real Options Binomial Tree Diagram 
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A numerical example is illustrated as follows. In a given city, the volatility of asset value 
of office buildings is 20% and the growth rate of construction or replacement cost is 5%. 
At t=0, the asset value of office building is $100 per sq.ft. while the construction cost is 
$70 per sq.ft. The Risk-free rate is assumed to be 5%. Using equations presented above, 
the real options binomial tree is as follows: 
 
t = 0  t = 0.25 t = 0.5  t = 0.75 t = 1 
         
149.18 
         73.59  
       134.99  75.59 
       72.67 
     122.14  62.31  122.14 
     71.77    73.59 
   110.52  50.37  110.52  48.55 
             70.88    72.67 
 S=100  39.64  100  37.84  100 
 K=70    71.77    73.59 
          C=30.28          90.48  28.23  90.48  26.41 
   70.88    72.67 
   20.23  81.87  17.81  81.87 
     71.77    73.59 
     11.47  74.08  8.28 
       72.67 
       4.40  67.03 
         73.59 
         0 
 
Figure 2.1: Numerical Example Binomial Tree Result 
 
 
In this example, the residual land value is $30 per sq.ft. while the option value of waiting 
is $30.28 per sq.ft. The option premium value (Cp) is $0.28 per sq.ft. This implies that 
office developers in this city should rationally wait to develop, rather than to exercise the 
option to develop at t=0. In theory, if the real options pricing model is applied to evaluate 
the land value, office developers in that city should be logically willing to pay up to 
$30.28 per sq.ft. on average for a piece of land to account for the option value. In fact, 
Quigg, L. (1993) examines the empirical predictions of a real options pricing model using 
a large sample of market prices. She finds empirical supports for a model that 
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incorporates the option to wait to develop land. The option model has explanatory power 
for predicting transactions prices over and above the residual value. Market prices reflect 
a premium for the option to wait to invest that has a mean value of 6% in their samples. 
 
Option values shown in bold and underlined indicate nodes where early exercise is 
optimal. In other words, in those nodes, the option premium value is compressed to a 
point which equals the residual land value. Therefore, developers have no incentive to 
wait but to exercise the option to develop, as illustrated in the binomial tree below:  
 
 
 
         Develop  
         Cp = 0 
       Develop 
       Cp = 0 
     Develop   Develop 
     Cp = 0    Cp = 0 
             Develop   Develop 
   Cp = 0    Cp = 0 
      Wait   Develop   Develop 
          Cp = 0.28   Cp = 0    Cp = 0 
   Wait    Develop 
   Cp = 0.62   Cp = 0 
     Wait    Develop 
     Cp = 1.37   Cp = 0 
       Wait 
       Cp = 2.99 
         Wait 
         Cp = 6.56 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Optimal Actions Binomial Tree Result 
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2.1.2 Strategic implication of the real options pricing model 
 
As illustrated with the model in Section 2.1.1, when the residual land value is less than 
the option value of waiting, developers should wait to develop. Based on the model, the 
magnitude of the option premium (Cp) is affected by the following variables: (1) the 
volatility of asset value, σs, (2) the growth rate of construction or replacement cost, g, (3) 
the maturity date of option, T, and (4) the risk-free rate, r.  
 
(1) Volatility of asset value, σs 
 
The option premium is an increasing function of the volatility of asset value: 
 !!!!!!  > 0 
 
As the volatility of asset value increases, the option premium value will increase as 
well. That makes intuitive sense because the option of waiting becomes more 
valuable if the future asset value is more uncertain. In cities with a higher volatility of 
asset values, more developers are expected to wait before they decide to exercise the 
option when asset values are more favorable to them.  
 
(2) Growth rate of construction or replacement cost, g 
 
The option premium is a decreasing function of the growth rate of the construction or 
replacement cost: 
 !!!!!  < 0 
 
As the growth rate of the construction or replacement cost increases, the option 
premium value will decrease. Intuitively, when the construction cost escalates faster, 
developers have a stronger incentive to start construction sooner rather than later. The 
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option value of waiting is diminished if the growth rate of the construction cost is 
high. Therefore, in cities where the construction or replacement cost increases faster, 
more developers are expected to exercise the development option earlier.   
 
(3) Maturity date of option, T 
 
The option premium is an increasing function of the maturity date of option, T: 
 !!!!"  > 0 
 
As the duration of option-exercising periods increases, the option premium value will 
increase. Conceptually, if external factors in the market allow developers to wait 
longer, the option premium will be higher, all things being equal. The Maturity date 
of the real options in real estate development can be considered a time by which 
developers lose the flexibility of choosing between developing immediately and 
waiting to develop. That maturity date depends on external factors in the market such 
as the level of competitions, land policy revisions, and a shift in market demand and 
internal factors of the developer such as the corporate investment time frame, the 
development schedule, and various business strategies. Grenadier, S. R., and Wang, 
N. (2006) interestingly show that developers are very impatient about choices in the 
short-term, but are quite patient when choosing between long-term alternatives. That 
paper indirectly demonstrates that when the maturity date of the option is further 
away from now, the option premium value will be higher and thus developers tend to 
keep the option of waiting more. It is noted that in this study, the maturity date of 
option is kept the same for comparison purposes across different cities and property 
types.    
 
 
 
 
 
	   22	  
(4) Risk-free rate, r 
 
The option premium is an increasing function of the risk-free rate, r: 
 !!!!"  > 0 
 
As the risk-free rate increases, the option premium value will increase. Intuitively, 
when the risk-free rate increases, the opportunity cost of investment will increase too. 
That makes the option value of waiting higher, vice versa. Therefore, when the risk-
free rate is low, more developers will tend to exercise their option to develop earlier. 
It is noted that this model assumes a constant risk-free rate for comparison purposes 
across different cities and property types.  
 
As the volatility of asset value and the growth rate of the construction or replacement cost 
are different among different cities and different property types, the timing behavior of 
developers are influenced by different option premium values under different situations. 
This thesis will examine if developers behave according to results predicted by the real 
options pricing model presented in previous sections. Then, the game theory presented in 
coming sections will be applied to understand further any discrepancy found in our 
empirical study.   
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2.2  Game Theory 
 
The game theory is the study of strategic decision-making. It is a discipline that studies 
situations of strategic interaction. In many real-world situations, the action of one player 
affects the pay-off of other players. The application of the game theory provides a 
strategic framework to analyze the best response of each player’s action. In the game 
theory, a solution concept is a formal rule predicting which strategies will be adopted by 
players, therefore predicting the result of the game. A strategy consists of a rule 
specifying which actions a player should take given the actions taken by other players. 
The most commonly used solution concepts are equilibrium concepts. An equilibrium is a 
configuration of strategies where each player’s strategy is his best response to the 
strategies of all the other players. The principle concept is illustrated in the following 
simplified example.  
 
In an efficient market, assuming it is a symmetric game, both rational player 1 and player 
2 have the option to invest now or to wait to invest in next period. The pay-off matrix of 
player 1 and player 2 is shown in Table 2.0, with pay-offs on the left referring to those of 
player 2 while pay-offs on the right referring to those of player 1.  
 
      Player 1 
Player 2 
 Invest Wait 
Invest 3 , 3 4 , 2 
Wait 2 , 4 1 , 1 
 
Table 2.0: Game Payoff Matrix Example 
  
The game pay-off matrix describes four possible outcomes. If both players invest, each of 
them gets a pay-off equal to 3. If player 1 invests while player 2 waits, they will get pay-
offs of 4 and 2 respectively. If both players wait, they will each get a pay-off of 1. In this 
symmetric game, when player 1 invests, the best response of player 2 is to invest as well 
to maximize its pay-off. When player 1 waits, the best response of player 2 is to invest 
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because the pay-off of investing now is bigger than that of waiting. Applying this logic to 
all possible scenarios, there is an equilibrium, as indicated with a bold box, in this game, 
which is that both players should invest now. In this simplified symmetric game, the 
application of game theoretical principles shows that the best response for both players is 
to invest now because that is the equilibrium of this game. A few other examples in later 
sections will show that there may be multiple equilibria in other games and discuss its 
implications.  
  
2.2.1 Payoff Matrix Setup for Real Estate Development 
 
In real estate development, the real-world situation is usually too complex for one model 
to analyze the optimal development strategy accurately. However, the interaction of the 
real option valuation and the game theory can provide a strategic framework to help 
better understand the interactive investment opportunity and to offer important strategic 
implications. The following model will be used to analyze the empirical data presented in 
this thesis. 
 
In this simplified setting, two developers have the option to develop now or to wait to 
develop in next period. If a developer develops, its pay-off is defined as the property 
asset value minus the construction or replacement cost. If a developer waits, its pay-off is 
defined as the option value of waiting. See Table 2.1 for the pay-off matrix of these two 
developers.  
 
      Developer 1 
Developer 2 
 Develop Wait 
Develop ωD2 St – Kte-rt , ωD1 St – Kte-rt ωL2 St – Kte-rt , Ct1fw 
Wait Ct2fw , ωL1 St – Kte-rt Ct2 , Ct1 
    
 Table 2.1: Game Theory Model Setup 
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 Where: St = property asset value per sq.ft. at time = t 
   Kt = construction / replacement cost per sq.ft. at time = t 
ωD1 = proportion of value for developer 1 when both developers 
develop 
  ωD2 = proportion of value for developer 2 when both developers  
develop 
  ωL1 = proportion of value for developer 1 when developer 1  
develops first (Leader) 
  ωL2 = proportion of value for developer 2 when developer 2  
develops first (Leader) 
ωF1 = proportion of value for developer 1 when developer 1  
waits (Follower) 
ωF2 = proportion of value for developer 2 when developer 2  
waits (Follower) 
Ct1 = option value of waiting for developer 1 when both developers 
wait (no Leader) 
Ct2 = option value of waiting for developer 2 when both developers 
wait (no Leader) 
Ct1fw = option value of waiting for developer 1 when developer 1 waits 
(Follower) 
    = max (ωF1 St+1 – Kt+1e-r(t+1) , e-r(t+1) [q Cu(t+1)1fw + (1-q) Cd(t+1)1fw ] ) 
Ct2fw = option value of waiting for developer 2 when developer 2 waits 
(Follower) 
    = max (ωF2 St+1 – Kt+1e-r(t+1) , e-r(t+1) [q Cu(t+1)2fw + (1-q) Cd(t+1)2fw ] ) 
 
The pay-off matrix is designed to capture a few important elements in the strategic 
planning process of real estate development. At a conceptual level, the simplified model 
reflects factors including the nature of developers, the nature of market, and the nature of 
timing.  
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Firstly, for example, if two office developers are players of the game, when they decide 
to develop at the same time, their pay-offs will depend on their strength to capture the 
market demand, which will be reflected by ωD1 and ωD2 (where ωD1 < ωD2 < 1 if developer 
2 is a stronger player). When two complementary developers, such as office and retail 
developers, are players of the game, the pie will actually grow bigger when they develop 
at the same time, reflected by ωD1 and ωD2 (where ωD1 ≤ ≥ ωD2 > 1). Therefore, the nature 
of developers would affect their pay-offs, which affects their optimal strategies 
accordingly.  
 
Secondly, market conditions affect how developers react to the market demand. For 
example, if the demand for residential space in certain submarkets is finite and known, 
developing alone will always yield a higher pay-off than competing with other developers 
to split the market, as indicated by ωD1 and ωL1 (where ωD1 < ωL1). In a different scenario, 
if the demand for retail space will increase through collaboration, retail developers will 
both get a higher pay-off when they develop together, as indicated by ωD1 and ωL1 (where 
ωD1 > ωL1). Therefore, the nature of market has strategic implications for actions of 
developers from a game theoretic perspective.  
 
Thirdly, like in other types of investments, the timing is essential to successful 
development projects. It is instrumental in determining the pay-offs in interactive games. 
For example, if the demand for more office space is obvious and the volatility of office 
building value is low, developers have less incentive to wait, i.e. they would rather be a 
Leader than a Follower to capture the First Mover Advantage (FMA) as reflected by ωL1 
and ωF1 (where ωL1 > ωF1). However, if the demand is uncertain and the new market 
requires synergy to enhance new demand, developers have more incentive to wait, i.e. 
they would rather be a Follower than a Leader to capture the Second Mover Advantage 
(SMA) as reflected by ωL1 and ωF1 (where ωL1 < ωF1). Therefore, the nature of timing 
affects interactive decisions of developers. As illustrated above, these three important 
factors are indicated by variables ωDi, ωLi, and ωFi in the model. In the next section, their 
strategic implications will be discussed based on different multi-equilibria scenarios and 
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a numerical example will be used at the end of the section to tie the real options valuation 
model and the game theory model together to make the framework clearer.  
 
2.2.2 Strategic implication of the Real Estate Development Game Theory Payoff Matrix  
  
From a game theoretic perspective, the action of Developer 1 and that of Developer 2 are 
mutually affected by each other. If both developers are rational players, they should all 
choose the equilibrium action to maximize their pay-offs. Once in equilibrium, no one 
can improve its pay-off by switching its decision. In the context of real estate 
development, the real option is irreversible. That is, once a developer decides to 
“develop”, it cannot switch back to the “wait” option. Therefore, developers are 
sometimes stuck in the sub-optimal situation. Based on the simplified model presented in 
the previous section, there are four equilibrium or multi-equilibria scenarios in a 
symmetric game with different variations in an asymmetric game. See Tables 2.2a to 2.2d 
for the four scenarios.        
 
Developer 1 
Developer 2 
 Develop Wait 
Develop C , C’ A , D’ 
Wait D , A’ B , B’ 
 
Table 2.2a: Scenario 1: Develop-Develop Equilibrium 
 
 
Developer 1 
Developer 2 
 Develop Wait 
Develop B , B’ D , C’ 
Wait C , D’ A , A’ 
 
Table 2.2b: Scenario 2: Develop-Develop / Wait-Wait Equilibrium 
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Developer 1 
Developer 2 
 Develop Wait 
Develop B , B’ C , A’ 
Wait A , C’ D , D’ 
 
Table 2.2c: Scenario 3: Develop-Wait / Wait-Develop Equilibrium 
 
 
Developer 1 
Developer 2 
 Develop Wait 
Develop D , D’ B , C’ 
Wait C , B’ A , A’ 
 
Table 2.2d: Scenario 4: Wait-Wait Equilibrium 
 
 Where: Value of A > B > C > D and 
   Value of A’ > B’ > C’ > D’ and  
   Whether A > A’ or B > B’ or C > C’ or D > D’ depends  
   on relative value of ωD1 & ωD2, ωL1 & ωL2, and ωF1 & ωF2.  
 
As explained in section 2.2, the equilibrium state in this model can be determined by 
comparing the pay-offs of each player given the action taken by another player. For 
example, in scenario 1, if Developer 1 decides to “develop”, the best response of 
Developer 2 should be to “develop” as well because C > D. If Developer 1 decides to 
“wait”, the best response of Developer 2 should still be to “develop” because A > B. 
Meanwhile, if Developer 2 decides to “develop”, the best response of Developer 1 should 
be to “develop” as well because C’ > D’. If Developer 2 decides to “wait”, the best 
response of Developer 1 should still be to “develop” because A’ > B’. In other words, 
there is a dominant strategy in scenario 1, which is to “develop”. In the model presented 
in Section 2.2.1, there would be only four possible equilibrium scenarios: Develop-
Develop Equilibrium, Develop-Develop / Wait-Wait Equilibrium, Develop-Wait / Wait-
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Develop Equilibrium, and Wait-Wait Equilibrium. Within each equilibrium, there are 
different variations of pay-off matrices, which depend on the relative value of ωDi, ωLi, 
and ωFi. To simplify the analysis process, only the specific cases represented above will 
be discussed. However, the same logic and analysis approach can be applied to all matrix 
variations.  
 
 Scenario 1: Develop-Develop Equilibrium 
 
In this scenario, several characteristics of the nature of market and the nature of timing 
can be observed from the pay-off matrix. Developers can get the highest pay-off when 
they decide to develop first while the other party decides to wait. It is clear that there are 
First Mover Advantages (FMA) in this market. However, as indicated in the matrix 
above, Develop-Wait is not an equilibrium state. The other developer will not choose to 
wait (getting a D), but rationally decide to compete instead (getting a C). It is also 
interesting to observe that the Develop-Develop Equilibrium does not yield the highest 
possible pay-offs to both parties. Both developers can get a higher pay-off by choosing to 
wait together in this period. It is a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. Similarly in real 
estate development, collaborations between developers can actually yield a higher return 
for both players. However, this is not a stable equilibrium state because either party 
always has a strong incentive to cheat (to develop first in order to gain FMA). Once one 
developer cheats, the other will rationally choose to develop as well, and thus revert the 
game back to an equilibrium state. At a conceptual level, it explains why developers 
choose to develop to compete even though the option value of waiting is actually higher, 
especially if there is a clear First Mover Advantage in this market.   
 
Scenario 2: Develop-Develop / Wait-Wait Equilibrium 
 
The market implication in this multi-equilibria scenario is somewhat similar to scenario 
1. The key difference is that there is no FMA in this market as indicated by a lower pay-
off if one developer develops first (ωLi < ωFi ). This market implies a much higher 
volatility of asset values, which makes the waiting option much more valuable. However, 
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collaboration between developers to develop together seems to create a good synergy for 
high pay-offs too (ωDi  > ωLi and ωDi  > ωFi). In multi-equilibria games, determining which 
action to take usually involves tactics of signaling and commitment. In this particular 
case, both developers get a higher pay-off if they decide to wait together in this period. 
This usually happens if the market is highly volatile and there is uncertainty about current 
and future demand.    
 
 Scenario 3: Develop-Wait / Wait-Develop Equilibrium 
 
This market is characterized by a strong Second Mover Advantage (SMA). The 
developer who decides to wait gets a higher pay-off than the developer who develops first 
(ωLi << ωFi ). The pay-off matrix implies that this market has a low volatility of asset 
values because the option values for both developers to wait are low. There is a clear 
demand for development but exogenous factors make the one who makes the first move 
much riskier than the one who follows. If the game is in a particular site, it will be similar 
to the game of chicken, in which neither party wants to develop first, but waiting together 
is even worse because of the loss of profit opportunity. This situation usually happens to 
developers who complement each other. For example, residential developers want to 
have enough retail activities to drive a higher residential demand before they develop 
while retail developers want to have enough residents to drive a higher shopping demand 
before they develop.   
 
 Scenario 4: Wait-Wait Equilibrium 
 
In this market, a combination of very weak demand and high volatility of asset value 
contributes to very high option values of waiting. Waiting is the dominant strategy for 
both developers in this market, and developing to compete yields a very low pay-off 
(very low ωDi). This market usually occurs during recession. Since ωDi  < ωLi, when the 
option value of waiting falls below certain trigger values, developers will want to develop 
first to capture FMA. Gradually, it will lead to a development cascade when all 
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developers decide to develop, partially creating the cyclic nature of real estate 
development.  
 
A numerical example is illustrated as followed. Using the same assumptions as presented 
in section 2.1.1, in a given city, the volatility of the asset value of office buildings is 20% 
and the growth rate of the construction or replacement cost is 5%. At t=0, the asset value 
of office building is $100 per sq.ft. while the construction cost is $70 per sq.ft. The risk-
free rate is assumed to be 5%. In this city, assuming office developer 1 is a stronger 
developer and is better able to capture the market demand if it competes with office 
developer 2, then ωD1 will be bigger than ωD2. In this example, ωD1 is 0.9 and ωD2 is 0.85. 
In this market, there is also a clear First Mover Advantage (FMA) because of the 
obvious, but finite, office demand. That implies that whoever develops first will benefit 
from the market condition. Therefore, ωLi will be bigger than ωDi, and in turn, ωDi will be 
bigger than ωFi. Since developer 1 is a stronger player than developer 2, it can be 
assumed that ωL1 is 1.15, ωL2 is 1.1, while ωF1 is 0.8, and ωF2 is 0.75. Using the real 
options valuation model presented in 2.1.1 to calculate Ct1, Ct2, Ct1fw and Ct2fw, where Cti is 
the option value of waiting for developer i when both developers wait and Ctifw is the 
option value of waiting for developer i when developer i waits while the other developer 
develops ( = max (ωF1 St+1 – Kt+1e-r(t+1) , e-r(t+1) [q Cu(t+1)1fw + (1-q) Cd(t+1)1fw ] ), the game 
theory payoff matrix is shown as follows:  
 
Developer 1 
Developer 2 
 Develop Wait 
Develop 15.00 , 20.00 40.00 , 12.50 
Wait 8.47 , 45.00 30.28 , 30.28 
 
Table 2.3: Numerical Example Game Payoff Matrix Result 
 
As the payoff matrix shows, the equilibrium between developer 1 and developer 2 is that 
they will develop together. This market is as depicted in Scenario 1: Develop-Develop 
Equilibrium. It is a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. In this case, the game theory 
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explains why developers still choose to develop even though their option value of waiting 
is actually higher.   
 
As illustrated above, the intrinsic values of ωDi, ωLi, and ωFi shape different market 
conditions. Together with the option value of waiting, which is largely influenced by the 
volatility of asset value in certain given markets, the game matrix creates a rich 
framework to analyze the timing strategy of real estate development at a strategic level. 
However, real-world situations are usually more complex than this simplified model. A 
few previous works by Grenadier (1996), Trigeorgis (1996) and Schwartz and Torous 
(2007) study some aspects of this option-game theoretic approach. It is particularly 
insightful to see how competitions erode option values and create a force to switch Wait-
Wait Equilibrium as indicated in scenario 3 to Develop-Develop Equilibrium. In the next 
section, a more comprehensive and in-depth review will be presented to show how 
previous works have contributed to the development and understanding of the real 
options valuation and the game theory, particularly in the context of real estate 
development.   
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3.0  Chapter 3: Literature review 
 
3.1  Real Options in Real Estate Development  
 
Since the 1980s, there has been much interest in academic research about real options 
valuation methods and game theory application in the business world. A vast array of 
models and frameworks have been studied and proposed. Option theory was first applied 
to real estate by Titman (1985). “Urban Land Prices under Uncertainty” by Titman 
(1985) provides a valuation model for pricing vacant lots in urban areas. An implication 
of this relationship between uncertainty and vacant land values is that increased 
uncertainty leads to a decrease in building activity in the current period. This model also 
provides insights into the role of real estate speculators who purchase vacant lots, and 
rather than develop them immediately, choose to keep them vacant for a period of time. 
The framework developed in this paper can also be extended to analyze other issues 
relating to real estate pricing under uncertainty. For example, it can be used to determine 
optimal time to demolish smaller building for redevelopment, and be used to analyze the 
effect of uncertainty on the optimal durability of buildings. This paper applies option 
valuation methods developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). “Real 
Estate Development as an Option” by Williams (1991) solves the option pricing problem 
analytically and numerically for the optimal date and density of development, the optimal 
date of abandonment, and the resulting market values of the developed and undeveloped 
properties. “Mixed-Uses and the Redevelopment Option.” by Childs, P. D., Riddiough, 
T., and Triantis, A. J. (1995) considers how the potential for mixing uses and 
redevelopment impact property value. Operating flexibility of this type is found to 
significantly increase property value when the correlation between payouts from different 
property types is low or when redevelopment costs are low. The ability to mix uses and 
redevelop over time is also shown to affect the timing of initial land development. 
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3.2  Empirical Testing of Real Options Models in Real Estate Development 
 
Until Quigg (1993), there had not been much empirical studies of real option models in 
real estate development. “Empirical Testing of Real Option-Pricing Models” by Quigg, 
L. (1993) examines the empirical predictions of a real option-pricing model using a large 
sample of market prices. She finds empirical support for a model that incorporates the 
option to wait to develop land. The option model has explanatory power for predicting 
transactions prices over and above the intrinsic value. Market prices reflect a premium for 
the option to wait to invest that has a mean value of 6% in their sample. She also 
estimates the implied standard deviations for individual commercial property prices 
ranging from 18 to 28% per years. “Uncertainty and the Rate of Commercial Real Estate 
Development.” by Holland, S., Ott, S., and Riddiough, T. (1995) empirically examines 
the relationship between uncertainty and investment using commercial real estate data. 
To sort out long- versus short-run effects of asset volatility on investment decisions, they 
extend the standard real options model to determine the probability of investment over a 
particular time horizon. In doing so, they find that an increase in asset volatility can either 
increase or decrease the probability of development, although the anticipated negative 
short-run relationship is confirmed when the land is “ripe” for development (i.e., near the 
development hurdle value). The role of uncertainty in determining the rate of real 
investment is then tested using aggregate data. By developing two measures of property 
value volatility, they empirically confirm the expected strong relationship between 
changes in uncertainty and the rate of development activity. “Effects of Uncertainty on 
the Investment Decision: An Examination of the Option-Based Investment Model Using 
Japanese Real Estate.” by Yoshida, J. (1999) examines the validity of the option-based 
investment model as opposed to the neoclassical investment model in the decision-
making of commercial real estate development, using aggregate real estate data from 
Japan, focusing on the effect of uncertainty. It concludes that various kinds of real 
options must be incorporated in investment and economic models. “Empirical Testing of 
Real Option-Pricing Models Using Land Price Index in Japan.” by Yamazaki, R. (2000) 
examines the way uncertainty plays a role in built land prices. This paper provides basic 
real option pricing models of land prices on the demand side in central Tokyo. The model 
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in this research analyzes micro land prices covering individual lot data provided by the 
Land Price Index. Since land prices are determined by both macro economic environment 
and micro lot-specific attributes, this paper utilizes both time-series economic data and 
cross-sectional (micro) data including uncertainty terms. In addition to the total 
uncertainty in asset prices, this research also gives some ideas of cross-sectional 
uncertainty in land price variations by utilizing cross-sectional amenity variables. These 
cross-sectional and time-series variables including these two uncertainty variables are 
pooled and the Ordinary Least Squares method is conducted. The results from the option-
based models favor the application of the real option theory in land prices. The total 
uncertainty with respect to built asset return has a substantial effect on increasing land 
prices, which implies that an increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in land prices. 
 
3.3  Game Theory in Real Estate Development 
 
With the real options theory studied extensively as applied to real estate development and 
the business world in general, scholars started to question its incomplete application and 
limitation. Strategic interaction seems to have huge implication of the explanatory power 
of the real options model. That is how game theory is used to extend the real options 
model. “The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and Overbuilding in 
Real Estate Markets” by Grenadier, S. R. (1996) develops an equilibrium framework for 
strategic option exercise games. He focuses on a particular example: the timing of real 
estate development. An analysis of the equilibrium exercise policies of developers 
provides insights into the forces that shape market behavior. The model isolates the 
factors that make some markets prone to bursts of concentrated development. The model 
also provides an explanation for why some markets may experience building booms in 
the face of declining demand and property values. While such behavior is often regarded 
as irrational overbuilding, the model provides a rational foundation for such exercise 
patterns. “Option Exercise Games: An Application to the Equilibrium Investment 
Strategies of Firms.” by Grenadier, S. R. (2000) provides a very general and tractable 
solution approach for deriving the equilibrium investment strategies of firms in a 
continuous-time Cournot-Nash framework. The impact of competition on exercise 
	   36	  
strategies is dramatic. For example, while standard real options models emphasize that a 
valuable “option to wait” leads firms to invest only at large positive NPV, the impact of 
competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at 
very near the zero NPV threshold. The Nash equilibrium exercise strategies are shown to 
display the useful property that they are equivalent to those derived in an “artificial” 
perfectly competitive industry under a modified demand curve. This transformation 
permits a simplified solution approach for the inclusion of various realistic features into 
the model, such as time-to-build. “An Equilibrium Analysis of Real Estate Leases” by 
Grenadier, S. R. (2003) provides a unified equilibrium approach to valuing a wide variety 
of commercial real estate lease contracts. Using a game-theoretic variant of real options 
analysis, the underlying real estate asset market is modeled as a continuous-time Nash 
equilibrium in which developers make construction decisions under demand uncertainty. 
Then, using the economic notion that leasing simply represents the purchase of the use of 
the asset over a specified time frame, it uses a contingent-claims approach to value many 
of the most common real estate leasing arrangements. “Investment Under Uncertainty 
and Time-Inconsistent Preferences” by Grenadier, S. R., and Wang, N. (2006) extends 
the real options framework to model the investment timing decisions of entrepreneurs 
with such time-inconsistent preferences; developers are very impatient about choices in 
the short-term, but are quite patient when choosing between long-term alternatives. Two 
opposing forces determine investment timing: while evolving uncertainty induces 
entrepreneurs to defer investment in order to take advantage of the option to wait, their 
time-inconsistent preferences motivate them to invest earlier in order to avoid the time-
inconsistent behavior they will display in the future. They find that the precise trade-off 
between these two forces depends on such factors as whether entrepreneurs are 
sophisticated or naïve in their expectations regarding their future time-inconsistent 
behavior, as well as whether the payoff from investment occurs all at once or over time. 
They extend the model to consider equilibrium investment behavior for an industry 
comprised of time-inconsistent entrepreneurs. Such an equilibrium involves the dual 
problem of entrepreneurs playing dynamic games against competitors as well as against 
their own future selves. “Real Options and Games: Competition, Alliances and Other 
Applications of Valuation and Strategy.” by Smit, H., and Trigeorgis, L. (2006) illustrates 
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the use of real options valuation and game theory principles to analyze prototypical 
investment opportunities involving important competitive / strategic decisions under 
uncertainty. It uses examples from innovation cases, alliances and acquisitions to discuss 
strategic and competitive aspects, relevant in a range of industries like consumer 
electronics and telecom. It particularly focuses on whether it is optimal to compete 
independently or coordinate / collaborate via strategic alliances. “Commercial Office 
Space: Tests of a Real Options Model with Competitive Interactions.” by Schwartz, E. S., 
and Torous, W. N. (2007) tests a real options model with competitive interactions using 
an extensive commercial real estate data base. The competitive nature of the local real 
estate market as proxied by the market’s Herfindahl ratio is found to have a significant 
effect on building starts: larger values of the Herfindahl ratio, consistent with less 
competition, are associated with fewer building starts. In particular, a one standard 
deviation increase in this ratio leads to a 25.9% decreases in the number of new building 
starts. Other variables suggested by the real options model, such as the volatility of local 
lease rates, are also found to be important. “Irreversible investment, real options, and 
competition: Evidence from real estate development.” by Bulan, L., Mayer, C., and 
Somerville, C. (2008) examines the extent to which uncertainty delays investment, and 
the effect of competition on this relationship, using a sample of 1214 condominium 
developments in Vancouver, Canada built from 1979 to1998. They find that increases in 
both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate 
investments. Empirically, a one-standard deviation increase in the return volatility 
reduces the probability of investment by 13 percent, equivalent to a 9 percent decline in 
real prices. Increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negate 
the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development. These results 
support models in which competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for 
the real options framework over alternatives such as the neoclassical NPV valuation 
method.    
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3.4  Land Value Studies 
  
“Insights on the Effect of Land Use Choice: The Perpetual Option on the Best of Two 
Underlying Assets” by Geltner, D., Riddiough, T. and Stojanovic, S (1996) considers the 
effect of land use choice on speculative land value and on development timing as 
reflected in the optimal “hurdle ratio” which triggers immediate development. They 
found that land use choice may add over 40 percent to land value under typical economic 
circumstances. The conditions for optimal development of the land become markedly 
more difficult to achieve when the two land uses have similar values. In fact, 
development will never occur when the two land use choices have equal value. “Swings 
in Commercial and Residential Land Prices in the United States” by Mulhall, M., 
Nichols, J., and Oliner, S. (2012) uses a large dataset of land sales dating back to the mid-
1990s to construct land price indexes for 23 MSAs in the United States and for the 
aggregate of those MSAs. The price indexes show a dramatic increase in both 
commercial and residential land prices over several years prior to their peak in 2006-07 
and a steep descent since then. These fluctuations have exceeded those in well-known 
indexes of home prices and commercial real estate prices. Because those indexes price a 
bundle of land and structures, this comparison implies that land prices have been more 
volatile than structures prices over this period. This result is a key element of the land 
leverage hypothesis, which holds that home prices and commercial property prices will 
be more volatile, all else equal, in areas where land represents a larger share of real estate 
value. 
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4.0  Chapter 4: Methodology & Data Collection 
   
4.1  Commercial Real Estate Asset and Land Value Data 
 
Asset values of 4 property types (Apartment, Industrial, Office, and Retail) in 30 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) spanning from 2001 to 2013 are collected from 
Real Capital Analytics, Inc (RCA) for the commercial portion of the study. The 
construction or replacement cost data spanning from 1993 to 2013 is collected from RS 
Means. The residual land value is defined as the difference between the asset value and  
the construction or replacement cost. For the commercial portion, the construction 
activity is measured by number of square feet completed (industrial, office, and retail) 
and number of units completed (apartment), with data collected from CBRE.  
 
The volatility (σ) of value or cost is calculated using historical data with the following 
equations:  
 
 ΔS = ln( !!!!!!.!") 
 
 SD = (!!!)!!!!  
 
 σ = SD x 4  (annualized volatility for quarterly data) 
  
4.1.1  Use of Real Capital Analytics (RCA) data 
 
The RCA asset value data is transaction-based, not appraisal-based, and it is based on 
independent reports of properties and portfolios $2.5 million and greater. Quarterly non-
smoothed data from 2001 to 2013 is used in the analysis of this paper.  
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4.1.2  Comparison between 30 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
 
Midwest South East West 
Chicago Atlanta Baltimore Los Angeles 
Cincinnati Charlotte Boston Portland 
Cleveland Dallas Miami San Diego 
Columbus Denver New York San Francisco 
Detroit Houston Philadelphia San Jose 
Indianapolis Memphis Washington, D.C. Seattle 
Kansas City Phoenix   
Minneapolis Tampa   
Pittsburgh    
St. Louis    
 
Table 4.0: 30 Metropolitan Statistical Areas for Commercial Markets Analysis 
 
Regarding the commercial markets, in general, RCA data shows that major U.S. cities 
such as Los Angeles, Washington DC, New York, and Boston are less volatile and less 
speculative than other second-tier or third-tier cities such as Pittsburgh, Detroit, 
Memphis, and St Louis. Overall, the volatility of the West region is the lowest and the 
Midwest region is the highest. RCA data demonstrates higher volatility than expected, 
which is probably due to idiosyncratic variations of the transaction-based data. However, 
for the purpose of this thesis, which studies the timing strategy of developers, transaction-
based data with higher volatility across all MSAs and property types is still consistent 
enough to be used for comparison purposes.   
 
Regarding the land cost ratio, it is defined as the ratio of the residual land value to the 
asset value. RCA data demonstrates that the asset value volatility is negatively correlated 
with the land cost ratio. In other words, cities such as Washington DC, New York, San 
Francisco, and Boston with low volatility have high land cost ratios. Cities such as 
Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Columbus with high volatility have low land cost ratios. In 
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section 5.0, the relationship between these variables and the timing strategy will be 
discussed empirically.  
  
4.1.3  Comparison between 4 property types 
 
Among the 4 property types (Apartment, Industrial, Office, and Retail), RCA data shows 
that the asset value volatility of office buildings is the lowest, followed by industrial 
buildings and retails. Apartment buildings have the highest volatility. For the office 
market, the East and West regions have the lowest volatility, while the Midwest region 
has the highest volatility. For the apartment and retail markets, the South and West 
regions have the lowest volatility, while the Midwest region again has the highest 
volatility. For the industrial market, the South and West regions again have the lowest 
volatility, while the East region has the highest volatility.  
 
Regarding the land cost ratio, for the office and apartment markets, the East region has 
the highest land cost ratio, followed by the West and South regions. The Midwest region 
has the lowest land cost ratio. For the retail market, the West region has the highest land 
cost ratio, followed by the East and South regions. The Midwest region again has the 
lowest land cost ratio. For the industrial market, the East region has the lowest land cost 
ratio. At the property type aggregate level, the data again shows that the asset value 
volatility is negatively correlated with the land cost ratio. Office buildings demonstrate 
the lowest volatility and high land cost ratios. Apartment buildings have the highest 
volatility and low land cost ratios. It is also true at the regional level, the East region has 
the lowest volatility, but the highest land cost ratio, for the office market. The regression 
analyses yield the following results: 
 
σ = α + β (LCR) 
 
Where: σ  = Asset Value Volatility  
  LCR = Land Cost Ratio (  !!!!  ) 
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 α = 
(P-value) 
β = 
(P-value) 
Overall 1.13 
(4.59 x 10-49) 
-0.0377 
(6.37 x 10-1) 
Apartment 1.26 
(1.79 x 10-14) 
-0.119 
(5.16 x 10-1) 
Industrial 1.14 
(6.49 x 10-10) 
0.186 
(2.84 x 10-1) 
Office 1.23 
(5.59 x 10-13) 
-0.623 
(5.17 x 10-3) 
Retail 1.38 
(1.88 x 10-9) 
-0.426 
(1.65 x 10-1) 
 
Table 4.1: Volatility and Land Cost Ratio Regression Results for Commercial Markets 
 
With the results shown above, overall, except for the industrial market, the volatility is 
statistically negatively correlated with the land cost ratio: 
 !!!"#$ < 0 
 
However, they are only weakly correlated, as indicated by the high P-values. The office 
market seems to be the only exception. Nonetheless, for any given MSA and property 
type, except for the industrial market, if the land value constitutes a small portion of the 
asset value, that asset type in that given market tends to be more volatile and relatively 
riskier to develop. The relationship between the volatility and the land cost ratio across 
30 MSAs and 4 property types is summarized below: 
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  Asset Value 
Volatility 
Land Cost 
Ratio 
 Overall 2 2 
 Apartment 2 1 
EAST Industrial 1 2 
 Office 3 1 
 Retail 2 2 
 Overall 1 4 
 Apartment 1 4 
MIDWEST Industrial 2 4 
 Office 1 4 
 Retail 1 4 
 Overall 3 3 
 Apartment 3 3 
SOUTH Industrial 3 3 
 Office 2 3 
 Retail 3 3 
 Overall 4 1 
 Apartment 4 2 
WEST Industrial 4 1 
 Office 4 2 
 Retail 4 1 
   
Table 4.2: Volatility and Land Cost Ratio Summary for Commercial Markets 
 
  Where: 1 = highest 
    4 = lowest  
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4.2  Residential Real Estate Asset and Land Value Data  
  
Asset values of single-family houses in 44 MSAs spanning quarterly from 1995 to 2013 
are collected from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy for the residential portion of the 
study. For the residential portion, the construction activity is measured by number of 
permits issued for single-family houses, with data collected from U.S. Census Bureau. 
Again, the volatility is calculated using the same method as presented in section 4.1. The 
land cost ratio is defined as the ratio of the residual land value to the house value. 
 
4.2.1 Use of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (LILP) data  
  
The data provided here contains estimates of the average value of housing, land, and 
structures, and price indexes for land and housing, for the average single-family detached 
owner-occupied housing unit in each of 44 large metropolitan areas in the United States.  
 
The land price and quantity data are derived from data on housing values and structures 
costs, and from price indexes for housing and construction costs. For each of the included 
44 metropolitan areas, house values and construction costs are derived using micro data 
from the Metropolitan American Housing Survey in a benchmark year. House values are 
reported directly in that survey, and construction costs are based on the age and square 
footage of the house. House prices are extrapolated forwards and backwards from the 
benchmark year using metro-area CMHPI and Case-Shiller-Weiss (when available) 
house price indexes. Construction costs are extrapolated forwards and backwards from 
the benchmark year indexes using construction cost indexes published by the R.S. Means 
Corporation. 
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4.2.2 Comparison between 44 metropolitan US cities 
  
Midwest South East West 
Buffalo Atlanta Baltimore Los Angeles 
Chicago Birmingham Boston Oakland 
Cincinnati Charlotte Hartford Portland 
Cleveland Dallas Miami Sacramento 
Columbus Denver New York San Diego 
Detroit Fort Worth Norfolk San Francisco 
Indianapolis Houston Philadelphia San Jose 
Kansas City Memphis Providence Seattle 
Milwaukee New Orleans Washington, D.C.  
Minneapolis Oklahoma City   
Pittsburgh Phoenix   
Rochester Salt Lake City   
St. Louis San Antonio   
 Tampa   
 
Table 4.3: 44 Metropolitan Statistical Areas for Residential Markets Analysis 
 
Regarding the single-family house market, LILP data shows opposite relationships 
compared to the commercial markets. Major U.S. cities such as Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, New York, and Boston are more volatile and more speculative than other 
second-tier or third-tier cities such as Pittsburgh, Detroit, Memphis, and St Louis. 
Overall, the volatility of the West region is the highest and the Midwest region is the 
lowest. LILP data demonstrates lower volatility than expected, which is probably due to 
the inherit smoothing effect of the appraisal-based data. However, for the purpose of this 
thesis, which studies the timing strategy of developers, appraisal-based data with lower 
volatility across all MSAs is still consistent enough to be used for comparison purposes.   
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Regarding the land cost ratio, the LILP data demonstrates that the volatility of house 
values is positively correlated with the land cost ratio. In other words, cities such as 
Washington DC, New York, San Francisco, and Boston with high volatility have high 
land cost ratios. Cities such as Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Columbus with low volatility have 
low land cost ratios. The regression analysis yields the following result, with P-values 
shown in parentheses:  
 
σ =  0.0265      +  0.0402 LCR 
(2.11 x 10-11) (1.06 x 10-6) 
 
Where: σ  = Asset Value Volatility  
  LCR = Land Cost Ratio (  !!!!  ) 
 
With the result shown above, it is confirmed that the volatility is statistically positively 
correlated with land cost ratio: 
 !!!"#$ > 0 
 
In other words, for single-family house markets in any given MSA, if the land value 
constitutes a large portion of the house value, the residential market in that given market 
tends to be more volatile and relatively riskier to develop. Compared to the correlation 
between the volatility and the land cost ratio in the commercial markets as shown in 
section 4.1.3, the regression result shows a much stronger correlation for the residential 
market, as indicated by the much lower P-values. The relationship between the volatility 
and the land cost ratio across 44 MSAs in the residential market is summarized below: 
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 Asset Value 
Volatility 
Land Cost Ratio 
EAST 2 2 
MIDWEST 4 4 
SOUTH 3 3 
WEST 1 1 
 
Table 4.4: Volatility and Land Cost Ratio Summary for Residential Markets 
 
  Where: 1 = highest 
    4 = lowest 
 
4.3  Data Summary 
 
As presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2, statistically, commercial markets and residential 
markets seem to demonstrate opposite relationship between the asset value volatility and 
the land cost ratio.  
 
 
Volatility Table High   Low 
 Regions Overall Midwest East South West 
 Apartment Midwest East South West 
 Industrial East Midwest South West 
 Office Midwest South East West 
Commercial Retail Midwest East South West 
 Uses Overall Apartment Retail Industrial Office 
 EAST Industrial Apartment Retail Office 
 MIDWEST Apartment Retail Office Industrial 
 SOUTH Retail Apartment Office Industrial 
 WEST Apartment Retail Office Industrial 
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Residential Regions Overall West East South Midwest 
      
 
Table 4.5: Volatility Analysis Summary for Commercial and Residential Markets  
 
 
Land Cost Ratio Table High   Low 
 Regions Overall West East South Midwest 
 Apartment East West South Midwest 
 Industrial West East South Midwest 
 Office East West South Midwest 
Commercial Retail West East South Midwest 
 Uses Overall Retail Office Apartment Industrial 
 EAST Office Retail Apartment Industrial 
 MIDWEST Retail Office Apartment Industrial 
 SOUTH Retail Office Apartment Industrial 
 WEST Retail Office Apartment Industrial 
      
Residential Regions Overall West East South Midwest 
      
 
Table 4.6: Land Cost Ratio Analysis Summary for Commercial and Residential Markets  
 
For clarity purposes, relative magnitudes, rather than exact numbers, are used to illustrate 
their relationships. In general, for commercial markets, the asset value volatility and the 
land cost ratio are negatively correlated statistically, while for residential markets, they 
are positively correlated. In section 5.0, implications of this observation on the timing 
strategy of developers in both commercial and residential markets will be studied and 
discussed.  
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4.4  Strengths & weaknesses of methodology 
 
One obvious difference between the RCA data and the LILP data is that the RCA data is 
transaction-based while the LILP data is appraisal-based. The RCA data appears to be 
more volatile because it records average asset value per sq.ft. actually traded in the 
market regardless of the quality of the properties. Therefore, asset values can vary greatly 
between quarters, inherently raising the volatility level. However, transaction-based data 
does truly reflect actual market values of the property type in the MSA under study. For 
the purposes of this thesis, which studies the relationship of the volatility and the land 
cost ratio on the timing strategy of developers, it is reasonable that as long as the same 
methodology is used to compare different MSAs and different property types, the data is 
consistent and representative for this study. Raw recorded data, rather than any smoothed 
data index, is used in order to preserve the accuracy of transactional values. RCA data 
also comprises a very comprehensive set of data which covers 4 different uses in 30 
MSAs spanning more than 10 years. It can draw powerful implications as applied to 
different property types in different regions.  
 
A similar logic can be applied to the LILP data. The data appears to be less volatile 
because it records average appraised house values quarterly. The house values tend not to 
move too much between quarters, so it is not reflecting the true volatility in the market. 
However, if the focus of the study is on comparing the effect of volatility and land cost 
ratio on construction activities between different MSAs, the data set is still very 
comprehensive and consistent, which covers 44 MSAs spanning close to 20 years. It is 
also very useful to draw insightful implications as applied to one MSA across time.  
 
With the rationales stated above kept in mind, in the next section, the game theory and 
the real options theory will be used to study the effect of the volatility and the land cost 
ratio on the timing strategy of developers empirically. At a strategic level, results will be 
discussed to evaluate the use of game theory and real options in real estate development. 
Two levels of relationship will be studied: (1) across time within a MSA, and (2) across 
MSAs within a time period for both the commercial and residential markets. 
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5.0  Chapter 5: Data analysis & Interpretation 
   
5.1  Empirical Testing of the Real Options Pricing Model 
 
As described in section 2.1.1, the real options pricing model is used to calculate the 
option premium value (Cp) for each property type in each MSA within a certain given 
time period. Theoretically, the option premium is a value indicating the magnitude of 
benefit for a developer to wait, rather than to develop now. In other words, the higher the 
option premium value is, the higher the benefit for a developer to wait is, the fewer the 
construction activity should be observed. For comparison purposes, the construction 
activity of each MSA will be population-adjusted, which will be measured as number of 
square feet completed per 1000 people or number of units completed per 1000 people, 
with population information collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
 
To study the relationship between the option premium, the land cost ratio, and the timing 
strategy of developers, the following regression is applied to measure the degree of 
correlation: 
 
CA = α + β (Cp) + γ (LCR) + ɛ 
 
Where   CA = Construction Activity 
  Cp = Option Premium value 
   = Ct - (St - Kt ) 
  LCR  = Land Cost Ratio 
   = !!!!  
   S = property asset value  
   K = construction / replacement cost  
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In this thesis, two levels of relationships are studied:  
 
(1) Across time within a MSA  
 
The volatility and land cost ratios of 4 property types (apartment, industrial, office, and 
retail) spanning quarterly from 2001 to 2013 will be used to analyze the commercial 
markets of Boston. The volatility and land cost ratios of single-family houses spanning 
quarterly from 1995 to 2013 will be used to analyze the residential market of Boston. 
Boston is chosen because of its completeness of available data. This time-series study 
will focus on how strong the correlation is between the option premium value, the land 
cost ratio, and the construction activity within one MSA through time. The strength of the 
correlation will help analyze the usefulness of using real options analysis in the timing 
aspect of real estate development.  
 
(2) Across MSAs within a time period  
 
The volatility and land cost ratios of 4 property types (apartment, industrial, office, and 
retail) in 2008 will be used to analyze the commercial markets of 30 MSAs listed in 
section 4.1.2. The volatility and land cost ratios of single-family houses in 2008 will be 
used to analyze the residential market of 44 MSAs listed in section 4.2.2. 2008 is chosen 
because of its completeness of available data. The uncertain nature of the pre-crisis and 
the post-crisis in 2008 may offer significant insights of developers’ timing strategy as 
well. This study will focus on how strong the correlation is between the option premium 
value, the land cost ratio, and the construction activity across different MSAs within a 
particular time period.  
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5.1.1  Regression Results - Commercial Real Estate 
   
(1) Across time within a MSA  
 
CA = α + β (Cp) + γ (LCR) + ɛ 
 
Boston Commercial 
Markets 
α = 
(P-value) 
β = 
(P-value) 
γ = 
(P-value) 
𝜕CA𝜕𝐶!  𝜕CA𝜕𝐿𝐶𝑅 
Apartment 2.217 
(8.34 x 10-2) 
-0.0069 
(4.95 x 10-1) 
-0.1133 
(9.13 x 10-1) 
-  - 
Apartment w/ 2-yr lag 3.955 
(1.92 x 10-4) 
-0.0274 
(1.03 x 10-2) 
-0.6277 
(2.20 x 10-1) 
- - 
Industrial 3259.4 
(1.76 x 10-7) 
-54.637 
(5.59 x 10-5) 
-868.44 
(6.35 x 10-3) 
- - 
Industrial w/ 2-yr lag 2413.0 
(1.17 x 10-5) 
-40.105 
(1.43 x 10-3) 
-473.02 
(9.35 x 10-2) 
- - 
Office 3725.5 
(3.03 x 10-3) 
-51.348 
(8.26 x 10-3) 
-2044.0 
(6.22 x 10-2) 
- - 
Office w/ 2-yr lag 965.91 
(2.83 x 10-1) 
-13.615 
(3.57 x 10-1) 
118.58 
(8.79 x 10-1) 
- + 
Retail 839.78 
(1.33 x 10-2) 
-9.8907 
(1.18 x 10-1) 
-268.33 
(2.90 x 10-1) 
- - 
Retail w/ 2-yr lag 878.86 
(2.63 x 10-2) 
-11.525 
(1.30 x 10-1) 
-279.48 
(3.38 x 10-1) 
- - 
 
Table 5.0: Time-Series Analysis Regression Results for Commercial Markets 
 
Regression results in general agree with results predicted by the real options valuation 
theory. However, a few regression results show that some variables are only weakly 
correlated, as indicated by high P-values. Comparing between the option premium value 
and the land cost ratio, the land cost ratio seems to demonstrate a less significant 
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statistical result than the option premium value does. That implies that the correlation 
between the land cost ratio and the level of construction activity is weaker than that 
between the option premium value and the level of construction activity. Among the 4 
property types, office and industrial markets show more significant statistical results than 
retail and apartment markets. That can imply that the effect of the real options theory has 
a stronger correlation with the timing strategy of office and industrial developers. 
Nonetheless, the results overall shows that the level of construction activity tends to be 
negatively correlated with the option premium value and the land cost ratio, which imply 
that if the option premium value is high, there is a bigger benefit for developers to wait, 
which yields to low construction activity. Similarly, if the land cost constitutes a large 
portion of the asset value, the construction activity in markets with that characteristic will 
be lower too. In the real options valuation method stated in section 2.1.2 and the 
statistical observation shown in section 4.1.3, the following relationships are presented: 
 
 
!!!!!!  > 0         &         !!!"#$ < 0 
 
Those relationships are not consistent with the regression results shown here. In other 
words, if volatility of a specific property type in a specific market is high, the option 
premium value will be high too, which naturally results in lower construction activity, as 
it is shown in the regression results. Since the volatility is statistically negatively 
correlated with the land cost ratio, the option premium value will be negatively correlated 
with the land cost ratio as well, which implies that high land cost ratios should result in 
higher construction activities. However, as it is shown in the regression results above, the 
land cost ratio and the construction activity are negatively correlated. The reason may be 
that either the land cost ratio and the volatility are relatively weakly correlated as shown 
in section 4.1.3 or other exogenous market forces may affect the relationship between the 
land cost ratio and level of construction, which is outside the scope of the model. In 
section 5.3, the potential issue of multi-collinearity of the model will be discussed and 
tested.       
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It is also noticed that the strength of the effect of the option premium value and the land 
cost ratios is indicated by the magnitude of the coefficients in the regression table. Since 
construction activity of apartment buildings is measured in number of units completed, 
the coefficients may appear to be a lot smaller than the rest of the property types. If 
average size of apartments is assumed to be 1000 sq.ft., the coefficients will be adjusted 
as follows:   
 
Boston α = 
(P-value) 
β = 
(P-value) 
γ = 
(P-value) 
𝜕CA𝜕𝐶!  𝜕CA𝜕𝐿𝐶𝑅 
Apartment 2217.4 
(8.34 x 10-2) 
-6.9481 
(4.95 x 10-1) 
-113.32 
(9.13 x 10-1) 
-  - 
Apartment w/ 2-yr lag 3954.6 
(1.92 x 10-4) 
-27.351 
(1.03 x 10-2) 
-627.68 
(2.20 x 10-1) 
- - 
 
Table 5.1: Time-Series Analysis Area-Adjusted Regression Results 
  
Comparing the magnitude of the coefficients, the strength of the effect of option premium 
value and land cost ratios on the level of construction activity across different property 
types in Boston is summarized below: 
  
Boston High   Low 
Option Premium Industrial Office Apartment Retail 
Land Cost Ratio Office Industrial Apartment Retail 
 
Table 5.2: Time-Series Analysis Summary 
 
The result above can imply that if office developers and retail developers have the same 
option premium value in a specific project, office developers tend to wait, which gives 
lower construction activity in the market, while retail developers tend not to wait, which 
does not lower construction activity as much. In other words, the option premium value 
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or the real options valuation matters more to office developers than to retail developers, 
at least in Boston. The same logic can be applied to land cost ratio and it can draw similar 
implications. In section 5.2, this observation will be re-visited again from a game theory 
perspective.   
 
(2) Across MSAs within a time period 
 
CA = α + β (Cp) + γ (LCR) + ɛ 
 
MSAs Commercial 
Markets in 2008 
α = 
(P-value) 
β = 
(P-value) 
γ = 
(P-value) 
𝜕CA𝜕𝐶!  𝜕CA𝜕𝐿𝐶𝑅 
Apartment 2.6168 
(1.04 x 10-2) 
-0.0142 
(2.47 x 10-1) 
-0.0329 
(9.58 x 10-1) 
-  - 
Apartment w/ 2-yr lag 0.5733 
(2.20 x 10-2) 
-0.0021 
(4.95 x 10-1) 
-0.0748 
(6.31 x 10-1) 
- - 
Industrial 1838.3 
(8.73 x 10-3) 
-12.061 
(3.09 x 10-1) 
-726.80 
(5.53 x 10-2) 
- - 
Industrial w/ 2-yr lag 334.90 
(4.18 x 10-2) 
-2.7732 
(3.31 x 10-1) 
-109.85 
(2.20 x 10-1) 
- - 
Office 590.94 
(2.55 x 10-1) 
-3.8779 
(6.18 x 10-1) 
574.50 
(3.45 x 10-1) 
- + 
Office w/ 2-yr lag 522.97 
(7.78 x 10-2) 
-5.5206 
(2.12 x 10-1) 
-105.10 
(7.56 x 10-1) 
- - 
Retail 613.74 
(3.40 x 10-2) 
-3.8820 
(3.03 x 10-1) 
-31.349 
(9.20 x 10-1) 
- - 
Retail w/ 2-yr lag 78.126 
(7.50 x 10-2) 
-0.2758 
(6.31 x 10-1) 
10.707 
(8.23 x 10-1) 
- + 
 
Table 5.3: Cross-Sectional Analysis Regression Results for Commercial Markets 
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Applying a similar process to analyze the regression results as in 5.1.1 (1), we notice that 
the regression results across multiple MSAs within a time period generally agree with 
results predicted by the real options valuation method as well. However, the regression 
results are not as significant as those of the time-series analysis discussed in section 5.1.1 
(1). P-values are a lot higher in this across-MSA analysis. The reason may be that 
different MSAs have drastically different market characteristics. That makes the option 
premium values play a different role in different timing strategies of developers, which 
leads to much weaker correlation between the option premium value and the land cost 
ratio with the level of construction activity across different MSAs in this regression 
analysis. In section 5.2.1 (2), this observation will be revisited again from a game theory 
perspective. Coefficients for apartment buildings in the following regression table are 
area-adjusted, assuming the average size of apartments is 1000 sq.ft.:   
 
 
MSAs α = 
(P-value) 
β = 
(P-value) 
γ = 
(P-value) 
𝜕CA𝜕𝐶!  𝜕CA𝜕𝐿𝐶𝑅 
Apartment 2616.8 
(1.04 x 10-2) 
-14.179 
(2.47 x 10-1) 
-32.852 
(9.58 x 10-1) 
-  - 
Apartment w/ 2-yr lag 573.31 
(2.20 x 10-2) 
-2.0588 
(4.95 x 10-1) 
-74.786 
(6.31 x 10-1) 
- - 
 
Table 5.4: Cross-Sectional Analysis Area-Adjusted Regression Results  
 
 
Comparing the magnitude of the coefficients, the strength of the effect of the option 
premium value and the land cost ratio on the level of construction activity across different 
property types in multiple MSAs is summarized below: 
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MSAs High   Low 
Option Premium Apartment Industrial Office Retail 
Land Cost Ratio Industrial Office Apartment Retail 
 
Table 5.5: Cross-Sectional Analysis Summary 
 
At an aggregate level across different MSAs, the results seem to imply that in the U.S. on 
average, the option premium value matters more to apartment developers than to office 
developers, at least shown statistically, while the reverse may happen in certain specific 
MSAs such as Boston as shown in section 5.1.1 (1). Comparing the results across 
multiple MSAs within a time period with the results across time within a MSA, it is 
noticed that both the option premium value and land cost ratio have a stronger effect on 
the level of construction activities in the across-time analysis, based on the magnitude of 
coefficients. The reason will be discussed further in detail in section 5.2 using the game 
theory model developed in section 2.2.1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   58	  
5.1.2  Regression Results - Residential Real Estate 
    
(1) Across time within a MSA  
 
CA = α + β (Cp) + γ (LCR) + ɛ 
 
Boston Residential 
Markets 
α = 
(P-value) 
β = 
(P-value) 
γ = 
(P-value) 
𝜕CA𝜕𝐶!  𝜕CA𝜕𝐿𝐶𝑅 
Single-family house 584.56 
(1.06 x 10-1) 
-0.1846 
(6.96 x 10-7) 
2432.6 
(1.43 x 10-5) 
-  + 
 
Table 5.6: Time-Series Analysis Regression Results for Residential Markets 
 
Assuming the average size of single-family houses is 1,500 sq.ft., the coefficients are 
adjusted as follows: 
 
Boston  
 
α = 
(P-value) 
β = 
(P-value) 
γ = 
(P-value) 
𝜕CA𝜕𝐶!  𝜕CA𝜕𝐿𝐶𝑅 
Single-family house 876,845.8 
(1.06 x 10-1) 
-276.91 
(6.96 x 10-7) 
3648,892.3 
(1.43 x 10-5) 
-  + 
 
Table 5.7: Time-Series Analysis Area-Adjusted Regression Results  
 
In the real options valuation method stated in section 2.1.2 and the statistical observation 
shown in section 4.2.2, the following relationships are presented for the residential 
markets: 
 
!!!!!!  > 0         &         !!!"#$ > 0 
 
Those relationships are not consistent with the regression results shown here. In other 
words, if volatility of the house value in a specific market is high, the option premium 
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value will be high too, which naturally results in lower construction activity, as it is 
shown in the regression results. However, since the volatility is statistically positively 
correlated with the land cost ratio, the option premium value will be positively correlated 
with land cost ratio as well, which implies that high land cost ratio should result in lower 
construction activity. However, as it is shown in the regression results above, land cost 
ratio and construction activity are positively correlated. Therefore, it implies that either 
land cost ratio and volatility may be relatively weakly correlated or other exogenous 
market forces may affect the relationship between land cost ratio and level of 
construction, which is outside the scope of the model. In section 5.3, the potential issue of 
multi-collinearity of the model will be discussed and tested.       
 
Compared with the commercial markets, the residential market also seems to be more 
sensitive to changes in the option premium value and the land cost ratio, as it is indicated 
by the larger magnitude of coefficients shown in the regression table above.  
 
(2) Across MSAs within a time period 
 
CA = α + β (Cp) + γ (LCR) + ɛ 
 
MSAs Residential 
Markets in 2008 
α = 
(P-value) 
β = 
(P-value) 
γ = 
(P-value) 
𝜕CA𝜕𝐶!  𝜕CA𝜕𝐿𝐶𝑅 
Single-family house 2.5655 
(6.18 x 10-1) 
0.00193 
(9.56 x 10-2) 
-11.196 
(8.37 x 10-3) 
+  - 
 
Table 5.8: Cross-Sectional Analysis Regression Results for Residential Markets  
 
Again, assuming the average size of single-family houses is 1,500 sq.ft., the coefficients 
are adjusted as follows: 
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MSAs  
 
α = 
(P-value) 
β = 
(P-value) 
γ = 
(P-value) 
𝜕CA𝜕𝐶!  𝜕CA𝜕𝐿𝐶𝑅 
Single-family house 3848.3 
(6.18 x 10-1) 
2.8949 
(9.56 x 10-2) 
-16,794.5 
(8.37 x 10-3) 
+  - 
 
Table 5.9: Cross-Sectional Analysis Area-Adjusted Regression Results  
 
What is peculiar about this regression result is that it seems to be opposite to that 
predicted by the real options valuation method. In this case, the option premium value is 
positively correlated with the level of construction activity. That means when the option 
premium value is high, the level of construction activity will be high too. The reason will 
be discussed further in detail in section 5.2 using the game theory model developed in 
section 2.2.1.   
 
5.1.3 Summary of the results 
 
For commercial markets, the higher the asset value volatility is, the higher the option 
premium value will be, and the lower the level of construction activities will result. 
Meanwhile, the higher the land cost ratio is, the lower the level of construction activities 
will result. At an aggregate level across multiple MSAs, apartments are the most sensitive 
to the option premium value, followed by industrial and office. Retail is the least 
sensitive to the option premium value. Compared between the time-series (across time 
within a MSA) study and the cross-sectional (across multiple MSAs within a time period) 
study, the time-series study seems to show higher sensitivity to the option premium value 
than the cross-sectional study does. The time-series study also shows more significant 
regression results than the cross-sectional study does.  
 
For residential markets, results between the time-series study and the cross-sectional 
study are not as consistent as those of the commercial markets study. In the time-series 
study, the higher the asset value volatility is, the higher the option premium value will be, 
and the lower the level of construction activities will result. Meanwhile, the lower the 
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land cost ratio is, the lower the level of construction activities will result. However, the 
cross-sectional study shows the opposite. Compared between the time-series study and 
the cross-sectional study, the time-series study again seems to show higher sensitivity to 
the option premium value than the cross-sectional study does. Between commercial 
markets and residential markets, the regression results show that residential markets are 
more sensitive to the option premium value than commercial markets do. Residential 
markets also show more significant regression results than commercial markets do.  
 
In the next section, game theory payoff matrix as presented in section 2.2.1 will be used 
to discuss some of the observation, discrepancy, and implication shown in the regression 
results above. The study will focus on how to use the game theory model to explain and 
complete the observations not fully predicted by the real options model, serving as a 
more comprehensive framework to study the timing strategy of developers and its 
relationship with volatility and land cost ratio.   
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5.2  Application of Game Theory Payoff Matrix 
 
As seen in section 2.1.1 and section 5.1, the real options valuation method provides 
insightful ways to explain developers’ investment behavior and economic market 
situations. However, the real options model takes a monopolistic approach and neglects 
the interactive effect of other players and characteristics of specific markets. To enhance 
the model and complete the picture, game theory is used to analyze the discrepancy 
between the predicted results of the real options model and empirical observations.  
 
In section 2.2.2, several equilibrium scenarios are discussed and a numerical example is 
used to illustrate the option game theoretic approach. Since the game theory model 
presented is conceptual in nature, the option game theoretic approach should only serve 
as a strategic framework for analysis purposes. Exact values of ωDi, ωLi, and ωFi will be 
very difficult to be determined. However, their relative values provide powerful 
implication to understand characteristics of the market and optimal strategy of 
developers. To simplify the analysis process without diluting the implication of the 
model, it is assumed that the given market is a symmetric game, which means that 
developer 1 and developer 2 have the same strength and under the same circumstances, as 
illustrated with the matrix below:   
 
 
 Developer 1 
Developer 2 
 Develop Wait 
Develop ωD St – Kte-rt , ωD St – Kte-rt ωL St – Kte-rt , Ctfw 
Wait Ctfw , ωL St – Kte-rt Ct , Ct 
 
Table 5.10: Symmetric Game Theory Model Setup   
 
Where: St = property asset value per sq.ft. at time = t 
   Kt = construction / replacement cost per sq.ft. at time = t 
  ωD = proportion of value when both developers develop 
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  ωL = proportion of value for the Leader 
  ωF = proportion of value for the Follower 
Ct = option value of waiting when both developers wait (no Leader) 
Ctfw = option value of waiting for the Follower 
    = max (ωF St+1 – Kt+1e-r(t+1) , e-r(t+1) [q Cu(t+1)fw + (1-q) Cd(t+1)fw ] ) 
  
Although the model is set up for two developers, the framework of the model can be 
extended to be applied to the whole market. In theory, the aggregate results of multiple 
games should reflect the market condition too. In the next section, this game theory 
model will be used to analyze the regression results presented in section 5.1 and 
conceptually explain any observed situation not predicted by the real options model.  
    
5.2.1  Strategic Implication in Commercial Real Estate 
  
(1) Across time within a MSA  
 
As presented in section 5.1.1 (1), in the particular case of Boston, development of 4 
property types (apartment, industrial, office, and retail) in general agrees with the real 
options theory. However, as shown in the regression results, industrial and office 
development seem to be more sensitive to the option premium value and show more 
significant regression results than apartment and retail development do. In other words, 
even though option premium values are all negatively correlated with level of 
construction activity, decrease in the option premium value will lead to greater increase 
in industrial and office development than in apartment and retail development.  
 
Using the same methodology as illustrated in the numerical example in section 2.2.2, 
office and retail developments in Boston will be analyzed from an option game theoretic 
perspective. With empirical data presented in section 4.1, the payoff matrix of office and 
retail developments are as follows:  
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Office Develop Wait 
Develop 108 , 108 156 , 103 
Wait 103 , 156 145 , 145 
 
Table 5.11: Office Game Payoff Matrix   
  
 
Retail Develop Wait 
Develop 80 , 80 123 , 81 
Wait 81 , 123 117 , 117 
 
Table 5.12: Retail Game Payoff Matrix   
 
For comparison purposes, ωDi, ωLi, and ωFi are assumed to be the same for both office and 
retail markets. As shown above, office market is similar to Scenario 1: Develop-Develop 
Equilibrium, while retail market is similar to Scenario 3: Develop-Wait Equilibrium. The 
intuition behind the model is that even with the same values of ωDi, ωLi, and ωFi, the 
intrinsic characteristics of different markets are influenced by asset value, construction or 
replacement cost, and volatility. As seen in the payoff matrix above, office developers 
tend to compete and develop together, even though the option value of waiting is higher, 
which leads to Develop-Develop Equilibrium. Meanwhile, retail developers tend to think 
more strategically about First Mover Advantage and Second Mover Advantage, which 
leads to Develop-Wait Equilibrium. The game theory model does make intuitive sense 
because office market does tend to compete for market demand between developers, 
while retail market focuses more on the success of building up a critical mass to create 
positive synergy, which makes the strategic timing of development more important. The 
game theory model also explains why the regression results show that office development 
in Boston is more sensitive to the option premium value than retail development does 
because more construction activity will result in the Develop-Develop Equilibrium of 
office market than the Develop-Wait Equilibrium of retail market. Thus, the model 
confirms the implication that level of construction activities will change more in the 
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office market than in the retail market per unit change in the option premium value, as it 
is indicated by the magnitude of coefficients in the regression results.      
 
(2) Across MSAs within a time period 
 
As presented in section 5.1.1 (2), the regression results across multiple MSAs within a 
time period generally agree with results predicted by the real options valuation method. 
However, comparing the results across multiple MSAs within a time period with the 
results across time within a MSA, it is noticed that option premium values have a 
stronger effect on the level of construction activities in the across-time analysis, based on 
the magnitude of coefficients. The time-series study also shows more significant 
regression results than the cross-sectional study does. In other words, the results imply 
that even though option premium values are all negatively correlated with the level of 
construction activity, decrease in the option premium value will lead to greater increase 
in construction activities in some MSAs than in some other MSAs.  
 
Using the same methodology as illustrated in section 5.2.1 (1) above, office markets in 
New York and Dallas will be analyzed from an option game theoretic perspective. With 
empirical data presented in section 4.1, the payoff matrix of New York office markets 
and Dallas office markets are as follows:  
 
 
 
New York Develop Wait 
Develop 552 , 552 697 , 445 
Wait 445 , 697 590 , 590 
 
Table 5.13: New York Office Game Payoff Matrix   
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Dallas Develop Wait 
Develop 24 , 24 49 , 36 
Wait 36 , 49 57 , 57 
 
Table 5.14: Dallas Office Game Payoff Matrix 
 
For comparison purposes, ωDi, ωLi, and ωFi are assumed to be the same for both New 
York and Dallas office markets. As shown above, New York office market is similar to 
Scenario 1: Develop-Develop Equilibrium, while Dallas office market is similar to 
Scenario 4: Wait-Wait Equilibrium. As seen in the payoff matrix above, New York office 
developers tend to compete and develop together, even though the option value of 
waiting is higher, which leads to a Develop-Develop Equilibrium. Meanwhile, Dallas 
office developers tend to value the option of waiting more and wait to develop until the 
market conditions become more favorable to them, which leads to a Wait-Wait 
Equilibrium. The game theory model does make intuitive sense because New York office 
market tends to have more competition, which will compress the option value of waiting 
in fear of pre-emption. That is also consistent with the low volatility and high land cost 
ratio characteristics of the market. Meanwhile Dallas office market tends to have 
relatively fewer competition, higher volatility, and lower land cost ratio, which is logical 
for developers to wait to observe the market more comprehensively before taking actions.  
 
The game theory model thus explains why the regression results across time within a 
MSA are more sensitive to the option premium value than results across multiple MSAs 
within a time period because different MSAs have different market characteristics, and 
thus different equilibria in different game scenarios. It also explains why the regression 
results across MSAs show much higher P-values and less significant results. Therefore, 
the effect of option premium values on the level of construction activities is different in 
different MSAs, and their correlation is weaker in the cross-sectional analysis. For 
example, more construction activity will result in the Develop-Develop Equilibrium of 
New York office market than the Wait-Wait Equilibrium of Dallas office market per unit 
change in the option premium value. 
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5.2.2  Strategic Implication in Residential Real Estate 
 
With similar methodology as presented in section 5.2.1 and empirical data as shown in 
section 4.2, residential markets in different MSAs are predominantly markets with 
Develop-Develop Equilibrium. 6 MSAs with very different volatility, land cost ratio, and 
market characteristics are selected for the analysis. Their game theory payoff matrices are 
as follows: 
 
San Fran. Develop Wait 
Develop 470 , 470 594 , 378 
Wait 378 , 594 502 , 502 
 
Table 5.15: San Francisco Single-Family House Game Payoff Matrix 
 
 
Boston Develop Wait 
Develop 196 , 196 262 , 149 
Wait 149 , 262 215 , 215 
 
Table 5.16: Boston Single-Family House Game Payoff Matrix 
 
 
Wash. DC Develop Wait 
Develop 166 , 166 232 , 118 
Wait 118 , 232 185 , 185 
 
Table 5.17: Washington DC Single-Family House Game Payoff Matrix 
 
 
Phoenix Develop Wait 
Develop 65 , 65 103 , 38 
Wait 38 , 103 76 , 76 
 
Table 5.18: Phoenix Single-Family House Game Payoff Matrix 
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New Orleans Develop Wait 
Develop 40 , 40 64 , 24 
Wait 24 , 64 47 , 47 
 
Table 5.19: New Orleans Single-Family House Game Payoff Matrix 
 
 
Atlanta Develop Wait 
Develop 6 , 6 34 , 0 
Wait 0 , 34 15 , 15 
 
Table 5.20: Atlanta Single-Family House Game Payoff Matrix 
 
 The market characteristics of the 6 selected MSAs is summarized as follows: 
 
MSAs High     Low 
House 
Value 
San 
Francisco 
Wash. DC Boston Phoenix Atlanta New 
Orleans 
Volatility Phoenix San 
Francisco 
Wash. DC Boston Atlanta New 
Orleans 
Land Cost 
Ratio 
San 
Francisco 
Boston Wash. DC Phoenix New 
Orleans 
Atlanta 
Option 
Premium 
Wash. DC Atlanta San 
Francisco 
Boston Phoenix New 
Orleans 
Construction 
Activity  
Atlanta Wash. DC Phoenix New 
Orleans 
Boston San 
Francisco 
  
Table 5.21: Market Characteristics Summary for 6 MSAs 
 
Per the regression results presented in section 5.1.2 (2), the option premium value is not 
negatively correlated with level of construction activity as it should be as predicted by the 
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real options theory. From the game theory perspective shown above, it is noticed that 6 
MSAs with very different market characteristics all tend to have Develop-Develop 
equilibrium. The summary table shown above does not demonstrate strong expected 
correlations between different parameters as implied in the real options model. In 
residential markets across different MSAs, the game theoretic approach seems to be more 
aligned with the regression results empirically, which show that option premium values 
do not have strong effect on the timing strategy of developers. Residential developers all 
tend to compete with each other and develop immediately whether they have a high 
option value of waiting or not. That partially explains the peculiar regression results 
presented in section 5.1.2 (2).  
 
5.2.3  Summary of the results 
 
For commercial markets, the game theory model explains and confirms some of the 
observations from the regression results shown in section 5.1. By analyzing different 
game theory payoff equilibria of different markets, it is noticed that level of construction 
activities will change more in office market than in retail market per unit change in the 
option premium value because office markets have a Develop-Develop equilibrium while 
retail markets have a Develop-Wait equilibrium. The game theory model also explains 
why the regression results across time within a MSA are more sensitive to the option 
premium value than results across multiple MSAs within a time period because different 
MSAs have different market characteristics, and thus different equilibria in different 
game scenarios. Therefore, the effect of option premium values on level of construction 
activities is different in different MSAs, and their correlation is weaker in the cross-
sectional analysis. For example, more construction activity will result in the Develop-
Develop Equilibrium of New York office market than the Wait-Wait Equilibrium of 
Dallas office market per unit change in the option premium value. 
 
For residential markets, the game theory model shows that option premium values do not 
have a strong effect on the timing strategy of developers. Residential developers all tend 
to compete with each other and develop immediately whether they have a high option 
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value of waiting or not, as illustrated by the 6 MSAs with very different market 
characteristics which all tend to have a Develop-Develop equilibrium. That partially 
explains why the option premium value is not negatively correlated with level of 
construction activity as it should be as predicted by the real options theory. 
 
Overall, the game theory model offers powerful insights to explain things that cannot be 
explained by the real options theory model. In the next section, benefits and limitation of 
applying the game theory and the real options theory to real estate development will be 
discussed.   
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5.3  Evaluation of the use of Game Theory and Real Options in Real Estate Development 
 
(1) Real Options Theory 
 
In the regression analyses presented in section 5.1, the results show various strength 
of correlation between the level of construction activity and the option premium value 
and the land cost ratio.  
 
CA = α + β (Cp) + γ (LCR) + ɛ 
 
Where   CA = Construction Activity 
   Cp = Option Premium value 
   LCR  = Land Cost Ratio 
 
Since the option premium value and the asset value volatility are positively correlated 
and the volatility and the land cost ratio are correlated to a certain degree as shown in 
sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.2, a potential issue of multi-collinearity may distort the 
regression results to study the effect of the option premium value and the land cost 
ratio on the level of construction activity.  
 
 
σ = α + β (LCR) 
 
Where: σ  = Asset Value Volatility  
   LCR = Land Cost Ratio (  !!!!  ) 
 
The multi-collinearity refers to a situation in which two or more independent 
variables in a multivariate regression model are approximately linearly related. To 
determine the degree of multi-collinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
method can be used as illustrated below: 
 
	   72	  
VIF = 
!!!  !! 
 
Where: VIF = Variance Inflation Factor  
   R2 = Coefficient of Determination  
 
A common rule of thumb is that if the VIF is higher than 5, the issue of multi-
collinearity becomes problematic. As it turns out, the VIF of the commercial markets 
is 1.0019 and that of the residential markets is 1.8266. Therefore, it is concluded that 
the multi-collinearity is not an issue in the model.  
 
While the regression results demonstrate certain market characteristics and general 
consistency with the real options theory, the correlations between the application of 
the real options theory and the timing strategy of developers in different markets vary 
drastically. This conclusion is particularly obvious in the commercial cross-sectional 
analysis that gives very high P-values, which implies that applications of the real 
options theory differ widely in different MSAs and different property types. 
Therefore, the real options theory alone per se is shown not to be a widely used 
valuation method in the timing strategy of real estate development yet, and it alone 
has limited explanatory power on observed market conditions. Nonetheless, the 
benefits and limitations of the real options model will be discussed further in sections 
5.3.1 and 5.3.2.  
 
(2) Game Theory 
 
The game theory takes interactive effect of other developers in the market into 
consideration. At a strategic level, it offers insightful explanations to observed market 
conditions that cannot be explained by the real options theory. It helps to elaborate 
the different characteristics of different property types in different MSAs through 
analyzing different equilibria of the game payoff matrices. Empirically, the matrix 
analyses also show that the game theory model is consistent with the regression 
results and reflects general market conditions. However, at an implementational level, 
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the game theory model is very hard to be applied in real-world situations. In this 
thesis, the game matrices are set up as symmetric games, where both players are equal 
in all aspects. In the actual markets, it is almost impossible to know the exact payoffs 
of your opponents. That may change your optimal action completely because of an 
inaccurate payoff matrix. The game matrix analysis also assumes that both players are 
rational. If either player is irrational, the game theory approach will have limited 
influence on the timing strategy of developers. Nonetheless, the advisory power and 
limitations of the game theory model will be discussed further in sections 5.3.1 and 
5.3.2.  
 
5.3.1 Benefits and Advisory Power of the method 
 
As demonstrated throughout the thesis, the interaction of the real options theory and the 
game theory provides a more comprehensive framework to analyze investment timing 
options in real estate development than the standard Net Present Value method.  
 
(1) Real Options Model 
 
The real options model forces developers to think more strategically about the 
benefits of waiting through the calculation of option values of waiting. It allows 
developers to analyze the maximum land cost they should offer through taking the 
volatility of the market into consideration when the option value is higher than the 
residual land value. It also implies that negative NPV does not necessarily mean bad 
investment options. The option premium value may be high enough to justify the 
profitability of the development option. Therefore, if the option premium value is 
calculated accurately based on the endogenous factors of the developer, the model 
allows it to offer a higher land price to outbid its opponents as demonstrated in Quigg 
(1993). The real options model can change the decision of developers drastically. It 
will have far-reaching implications on the development strategies of developers.  
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(2) Game Theory Model 
 
While the real options model focuses on the development strategies internally, the 
game theory model analyzes them externally. Interaction with other developers is an 
integral part of the real estate game. The game payoff matrix offers powerful, and yet 
sometimes counter-intuitive, implications to advise developers with the optimal 
responses. It allows developers to analyze real estate development strategies from an 
equilibrium perspective, rather than to only focus on maximizing their own payoffs 
per se. The actual application of the game theory model in a business strategic setting 
will go beyond the quantitative aspect of the theory as it involves other strategic 
aspects such as signaling, sequential moves, repeated games, threats, and promises. 
However, the game payoff matrix provides an insightful tool to analyze development 
options based on different market characteristics as described in section 2.2.2. 
 
(3) Regression Analysis from Option Game Theoretic Perspective 
 
As illustrated in sections 4.0 and 5.0, important information reflecting the U.S. 
markets is extrapolated from the model using an option game theoretic approach. 
Those market characteristics are instrumental to help developers make the optimal 
decision. For example, an office developer in Boston, knowing that the Boston office 
market tends to have a Develop-Develop equilibrium as shown in section 5.2.1, 
should expect that other developers will compete to develop. In this case, its strategy 
of waiting may lead to losses because of pre-emption even though it may have a high 
option value of waiting. Therefore, the option game theoretic approach provides 
powerful market insights in the decision-making process.            
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5.3.2 Limitations of the method 
 
Although the option game theoretic approach works well at a strategic level, there are a 
few hurdles that make it hard to be widely used in real estate development. Some of them 
have been mentioned briefly in previous sections. 
 
(1) Real Options Model 
 
The model used in this thesis is based on the fundamental binomial tree method. 
Asset values and construction or replacement costs fluctuate in a discrete fashion at 
hypothetical time intervals. The construction period is assumed to be simultaneous. A 
constant risk-free rate is assumed. There are other nuances in real estate development 
that are not captured in the simplified model such as permitting period duration, 
uniqueness of each property, transactional costs and other miscellaneous fees in the 
valuation process, and other exogenous market factors which may affect the option 
value calculation. At the aggregate level, the simplified model as presented in this 
thesis works well for comparing purposes across different MSAs and different 
property types. However, using it at the property level to calculate the exact option 
premium value for a specific project will be inadequate. To quantify and capture all 
variables in a real estate development project, which is by nature very complex, will 
make the real options model too complicated to be practical. That will involve lots of 
assumptions, which lead to high degree of idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the real 
options theory takes a monopolistic setting, which does not take into account the 
interactive effect of other players. However, real estate markets are rarely 
monopolistic. Therefore, option values will be eroded by competitions as 
demonstrated in Grenadier (1996) and Schwartz and Torous (2007). This type of 
exogenous factors is not captured in real options models. That is why although the 
real options theory is very powerful and insightful in theory, it is not widely used in 
real estate development in practice yet.   
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(2) Game Theory Model 
 
The simplified game theory model is based on the game payoff matrix analysis. 
Payoffs are calculated using the real options model setup. Therefore, the payoffs 
reflect any limitation embedded in the real options model as well. In practice, it will 
be almost impossible to accurately calculate the payoffs of the opponent and the 
corresponding values of ωDi, ωLi, and ωFi. Again, at the aggregate level, the simplified 
model as presented in this thesis works well for comparing purposes across different 
MSAs and different property types to provide strategic insights to complete the real 
options model. However, it will be very hard to apply it at the property level. 
Moreover, the game theory model as presented in this thesis does not take into 
account any exogenous factors such as non-project specific motives of opponents, 
non-payoff-maximizing business strategies of opponents, faux information signaled 
by opponents. It also assumes that all players are rational and their goal is to 
maximize payoffs. If any of the assumptions is not true, the equilibrium concluded 
may not be a true representation of optimal actions for each developer. That is why 
the game theory model is not usually applied quantitatively in real-world situations, 
in the context of real estate development. Nonetheless, if the model is used at the 
conceptual and strategic level, the accuracy of the payoffs does not need to extremely 
high, and the model can still provide powerful insights to reflect the market 
characteristics and to help developers analyze their optimal response in the market 
they are developing.     
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6.0 Chapter 6: Conclusions 
   
6.1  Conclusion 
  
This thesis investigates the use of the game theory and the real options theory in real 
estate development at the strategic level, trying empirically to explain different economic 
observations among different metropolitan cities and different property types. 
 
The real options theory provides a rich theoretical framework to analyze investment 
values in real estate development. It takes the market uncertainty into consideration, 
while the widely used neoclassical NPV valuation method takes a deterministic approach. 
A simplified real options valuation model is set up in this thesis to calculate the option 
premium value of waiting for developers. However, since it is done in a monopolistic 
setting, the strategic interaction aspect of real estate development will be analyzed using 
the game theory model. The interaction of the game theory model and the real options 
model will provide a comprehensive and powerful framework to study the timing strategy 
of developers.  
 
Using data spanning quarterly from 1995 to 2013 among 5 property types (single-family 
house, apartment, industrial, office, and retail) and 44 MSAs, this thesis analyzes the 
relationships empirically between the volatility of underlying assets, the land cost ratio, 
the option premium value, and the timing of development. The aims of the study are 
twofold. First, the study compares different market characteristics among different MSAs 
and different property types from the option game theoretic perspective. Second, it 
analyzes the effect and the use of the game theory and the real options theory in the 
context of real estate development. The key results and observations are summarized 
below: 
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(1) Volatility and Land Cost Ratio 
 
In general, commercial markets and residential markets show opposite results. The 
data shows that major U.S. cities such as Los Angeles, Washington DC, New York, 
and Boston are less volatile in the commercial markets, but more volatile in the 
residential markets. Second-tier or third-tier cities such as Pittsburgh, Detroit, 
Memphis, and St Louis demonstrate the opposite. Regarding property types, overall, 
apartment buildings have the highest volatility, followed by retail and industrial 
buildings. Office buildings have the lowest volatility.  
 
For commercial markets, the volatility is negatively correlated with the land cost 
ratio, but the regression result is not too significant. Therefore, they are only weakly 
correlated. Regarding property types, retail buildings have the highest land cost ratio, 
followed by office and apartment buildings. Industrial buildings have the lowest land 
cost ratio. For residential markets, the volatility is positively correlated with the land 
cost ratio, and the regression result is very significant. That means that major U.S. 
cities with high volatility in the residential markets also have high land cost ratios, 
and vice versa.     
 
(2) Option Premium Value, Land Cost Ratio and Construction Activity 
 
For commercial markets, the higher the asset value volatility is, the higher the option 
premium value will be, and the lower the level of construction activities will result. 
Meanwhile, the higher the land cost ratio is, the lower the level of construction 
activities will result. At an aggregate level across multiple MSAs, apartments are the 
most sensitive to option premium value, followed by industrial and office. Retail is 
the least sensitive to option premium value. Compared between the time-series 
(across time within a MSA) study and the cross-sectional (across multiple MSAs 
within a time period) study, the time-series study seems to show higher sensitivity to 
option premium value than the cross-sectional study does. The time-series study also 
shows more significant regression results than the cross-sectional study does.  
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For residential markets, results between the time-series study and the cross-sectional 
study are not as consistent as those of the commercial markets study. In the time-
series study, the higher the asset value volatility is, the higher the option premium 
value will be, and the lower the level of construction activities will result. Meanwhile, 
the lower the land cost ratio is, the lower the level of construction activities will 
result. However, the cross-sectional study shows the opposite. Compared between the 
time-series study and the cross-sectional study, the time-series study again seems to 
show higher sensitivity to option premium value than the cross-sectional study does. 
Between commercial markets and residential markets, the regression results show that 
residential markets are more sensitive to option premium value than commercial 
markets do. Residential markets also show more significant regression results than 
commercial markets do. Overall, the correlation is a lot stronger between the option 
premium value and the level of construction activity than that between land cost ratio 
and the level of construction activity. In the Variance Inflation Factor tests for the 
issue of multi-collinearity, both results of commercial markets and residential markets 
show that the correlation between the option premium value and the land cost ratio is 
not strong and problematic enough to distort their effect on the level of construction 
activity.  
 
(3) Game Theory and Real Options Theory 
 
Overall, the game theory model offers powerful insights to explain things that cannot 
be explained by the real options theory model. 
 
For commercial markets, the level of construction activities will change more in 
office market than in retail market per unit change in option premium value because 
office markets have a Develop-Develop equilibrium while retail markets have a 
Develop-Wait equilibrium. The game theory model also explains why the regression 
results across time within a MSA are more sensitive to option premium value than 
results across multiple MSAs within a time period because different MSAs have 
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different market characteristics, and thus different equilibria in different game 
scenarios. Therefore, the effect of option premium values on level of construction 
activities is different in different MSAs, and their correlation is weaker in the cross-
sectional analysis. For example, more construction activity will result in the Develop-
Develop Equilibrium of New York office market than the Wait-Wait Equilibrium of 
Dallas office market per unit change in option premium value. 
 
For residential markets, the game theory model shows that option premium values do 
not have a strong effect on the timing strategy of developers. Residential developers 
all tend to compete with each other and develop immediately whether they have a 
high option value of waiting or not, as illustrated by the 6 MSAs with very different 
market characteristics which all tend to have a Develop-Develop equilibrium. That 
partially explains why option premium value is not negatively correlated with level of 
construction activity as it should be as predicted by the real options theory. 
 
As demonstrated throughout the thesis, the interaction of the real options theory and the 
game theory provides a more comprehensive framework to analyze investment timing 
options in real estate development than the standard Net Present Value method. The real 
options model forces developers to think more strategically about the benefits of waiting 
through the calculation of option values of waiting. It can change the decision of 
developers drastically and has far-reaching implications on the development strategies of 
developers. While the real options model focuses on the development strategies 
internally, the game theory model analyzes them externally. The game payoff matrix 
offers powerful, and yet sometimes counter-intuitive, implications to advise developers 
with the optimal responses. Although the option game theoretic approach works well at a 
strategic level, there are a few hurdles that make it hard to be widely used in real estate 
development. To quantify and capture all variables in a real estate development project, 
which is by nature very complex, will make the real options model too complicated to be 
practical. It is also impossible to accurately calculate the payoffs of the opponent and the 
corresponding values of ωDi, ωLi, and ωFi in the game theory model. This partially 
explains why the game theory and the real options theory are not as widely used in real 
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estate development as they are in other industries such as the pharmaceutical industry. 
Nonetheless, at a conceptual and strategic level, the option game theoretic approach is 
still a very valuable and robust tool to analyze the market characteristics, to calculate the 
intrinsic land value, and to strategize the optimal action in response to the interactive 
effect between players in real estate development.  
 
6.2  Topics for further study 
 
There are a few questions that are worth further investigating, which are touched on 
briefly in this thesis but do not go in detail yet; (1) Can there be a unified model that 
capture the essences of the game theory and the real options theory which can be used 
like what the Black-Scholes formula is used in the financial industry to become a 
standard formula to calculate the intrinsic land value? (2) If such model exists, how 
would that change the real estate game? Would it make lands tradable like stocks and 
would there be a derivative market for real estate? (3) Is there a way to measure whether 
a market is in the equilibrium state as predicted by the game theory model, and whether 
developers in that market act accordingly? So, will the game theory become a much more 
quantifiable business strategy? (4) When the same methodology is used to analyze other 
global markets, will that give similar results to the U.S. markets, and if not, what makes 
the results different?    
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